CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.630
11 August 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Michel Servais (Belgium)

GE.92-62584/5018H (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 630th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As Belgium takes up the Chair I would like to make a brief statement in my capacity as President. First of all, allow me to perform what is in fact a pleasant duty as I pay tribute to my predecessors on discharging their presidential functions. Each of them strove to guide our work dynamically in order to translate into actions and texts our common ideal of disarmament, which is set forth so well and with such restraint in the first words of the preamble to the United Nations Charter: "We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ...". All of us here know from experience how long and how difficult is the road that leads us to the achievement of this noble objective. Each of my predecessors has encouraged us along that road, and on behalf of you all I would like to thank our colleagues Ambassadors Arteaga, Calovski, Mutuale, Kinkanke, Semichi, García Moritán and O'Sullivan. For some of them the task was all the more difficult as grave and tragic events were occurring in their own countries. They deserve all the more credit for carrying out their task, and they have the right to all our gratitude.

In my reading as a student, one of the things which struck me most was the thought expressed by the philosopher Henri Berson in his work Creative Evolution, written in 1901, which I quote more or less from memory: "What characterizes the man of action is his ability to go beyond everyday events, but without neglecting them, and at the same time to view the future in a very broad perspective." All of us here are men and women of action who are noble-hearted, as my first eight months among you have enabled me to realize. What I find really extraordinary is the will that we all have to find common solutions to all the problems we have to solve. It is from this common will that I hope I will be able to extract the necessary resources to direct our work, with the help of each and every one of you, with the essential help of our Secretary-General and his competent and devoted team.

Last Friday we took an important step towards the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. Now each of our delegations has to evaluate the overall solution which will be put before us very shortly by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner. As he has so often told us, none of us will find in the final proposal all of the objectives we set out with. This is in the very nature of multilateral diplomacy, the "art of the possible". On behalf of all of you I congratulate and thank Ambassador von Wagner and his team for the amazing amount of work they have done since last January, and I warmly encourage him to continue his effort for just a few more weeks. To all those who have taken part in these arduous and difficult negotiations, to the members and observers in our Conference, I would ask them to do all they possibly can to convince their Governments that the work we have done in Geneva, even if it is not perfect in their eyes, is as far as we can go in the "art of the possible" I referred to a moment ago. Our objective hic et nunc remains the successful conclusion of the negotiation on chemical weapons. Our credibility is at stake. If we were to fail in finalizing our work in this area, I think it would be a waste

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of time to wonder about the fate and the future tasks of the Conference on Disarmament, because we would have shown the international community that we were unable to meet its concerns and to soothe its fears.

I am proceeding from the assumption that we will succeed in the task which was begun so many years ago. Let us submit the results of our efforts to the next General Assembly and try to surround the convention on chemical weapons with the greatest possible measure of support. We will then have proved that we are able to deal with all the other problems of disarmament, following the lines of thought that several of you have already sketched out in this forum. I will neglect none of these ideas, and I intend to abide by the proposals formulated last week by my colleague and friend, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, by continuing the informal consultations which he undertook on the future of the Conference itself, and I intend to share my own ideas with you when the time is right. Between now and the end of this session I urge you to make the best possible use of the little time available to us to step up consultations in the various working groups and informal meetings so that we can draft our report to the United Nations General Assembly on what we have done and on the various items on our agenda.

I have no speakers on the list for today. Does any member of the Conference wish to take the floor? I see Paul O'Sullivan, the Ambassador of Australia, asking for the floor.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, I appreciate the chance to make a short intervention and to say first of all, of course, how pleased I am to see you presiding over our work. Last week I made a statement on behalf of the Australia Group in plenary, and Ambassador Shah of India requested that the document which I was reading be circulated as a CD document and I have asked the secretariat to do that. I believe that document is available to all delegations now.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you Mr. Ambassador. Indeed I see that the document has been distributed as CD/1164. I also see the Ambassador of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán, asking for the floor.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Allow me to express the satisfaction of my delegation, Mr. President, at seeing you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament starting today. You are a diplomat with well-known professional skills and we welcome the fact that you are now conducting the business of our body at such a special time. You may be assured of our cooperation in your important tasks. I also wish to avail myself of this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, for the energy and imagination he made available to the Conference when he was presiding over this body.

You have taken the Chair at a particularly important time for the Conference on Disarmament, not only because we are taking a historic step with the forthcoming adoption of an instrument of unique type and scope, but also because we must buckle down to the task of reflecting in our annual report to the General Assembly the state of progress for each of the items on our

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agenda. This is the stage of the annual harvest. A delicate process that calls for a large dose of respect and a sense of perspective. A task which is necessary, without doubt one of importance, and not an easy one. A task where with great mutual respect we must put forward our national points of view, some of them in harmony and others reflecting the variety and wealth of ideas to be found in this chamber. It is the topic of the report that leads me to ask for the floor briefly this morning, since some doubts have arisen about the position of some delegations on items 2 and 3 of our agenda. And in this regard, I have received instructions to place on record some brief general remarks on these two items from the point of view of my delegation. I am not going to repeat the importance and priority we attach to the two items, items 2 and 3 of the agenda, which are clear from our active participation in informal meetings. However, I have been asked to emphasize that in our opinion, the validity and significance of the endeavours of the Conference on both those topics will be related to our capability to analyse them in the light of prevailing circumstances and political developments, in particular since the disappearance of the East-West strategic struggle and the positive trends that are to be seen in various regions. From this viewpoint it would appear more appropriate for the emphasis of the Conference on Disarmament on items 2 and 3 to be focused on practical approaches to specific issues. And we are sure that there will be no lack of ideas in undertaking this exercise. This has been the reason, among others, which led my delegation to the not always easy task of placing on record its different point of view, and which consequently prevented it from associating itself with the statement made by delegations within its own group on items 2 and 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador García Moritán, first of all for his kind remarks concerning the Conference. We have taken note of his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? Apparently not. Before I adjourn I would like to inform you of the situation relating to the preparation of the Conference's annual report to the General Assembly, to which I referred in my statement. I will be submitting to the Conference for adoption at the next plenary meeting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was presented by the Chairman of that Committee during our 629th plenary meeting and is contained in document CD/1160. The informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference started yesterday. The Chairman of those consultations, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, will be holding further consultations on Thursday, and maybe a third round next week, in order to help to prepare this chapter of the annual report. Consultations are continuing on agenda item 9 entitled "Transparency in armaments". They are being conducted by Ambassador Zahran of Egypt. We hope that his efforts will soon be successful. There are still matters to be resolved under items 2 and 3 of the agenda, as Ambassador García Moritán has just mentioned. I hope that we can find a solution satisfactory to all delegations before Thursday morning, so that we can hold informal consultations which will allow us to reach agreement this week. During tomorrow's presidential consultations we will be able to decide how to deal with agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban",

(The President)

in our annual report of the Conference. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will be meeting this afternoon to consider its report to the Conference. I hope that with everybody's cooperation and goodwill, the report will be adopted today. As I stressed in my opening statement, there is still important work to be done in preparing our annual report. We will have to step up our efforts to arrive at agreement on all pending matters.

There are no more matters for today, and if there are no objections I intend to adjourn. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 13 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.631
13 August 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Michel Servais (Belgium)

GE.92-62614/4822B (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 631st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I announced at last Tuesday's plenary meeting, today I will be submitting to the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1160. We will proceed to adopt the document as soon as we have run through the list of speakers.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Austria, Argentina, Romania (who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) and India and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Lang.

Mr. LANG (Austria) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament and to greet you as the representative of a country very close to mine. We are convinced that you will carry out your responsibilities with your customary brio.

Today, 31 years to the day after the building of the Berlin Wall, we realize how far the world has come in the last few years. I believe that the new international situation has greatly contributed to the progress achieved in working towards a chemical weapons ban. Just under a week after the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, it is certainly appropriate for me to dwell on the subject a little. Unfortunately, I am doing so without the great satisfaction I would have liked to have shown. The consensus that we still hoped for a short time ago on the chemical weapons convention has not been totally achieved. The untiring efforts of Ambassador von Wagner of Germany might have led us to hope for a more unequivocal outcome. Austria keenly regrets that complete and unambiguous consensus was not reached last Friday. We hope that all the States which expressed reservations on the proposed amendments contained in document CD/CW/WP.427 will be able to join those who considered that the negotiations had already been completed on 7 August. As a State participating in CSCE, we hope most particularly that the Russian Federation will be able to join the consensus which we would like to see emerge on 26 August. If not, what will happen if the Russian Federation, a signatory of the Charter of Paris, were not to be among the original signatories of the chemical weapons convention? More specifically, what would happen to the commitment entered into by all the parties to the Charter of Paris, that they would be among the original signatories of the convention?

As for the Conference on Disarmament itself, we believe that the lack of a consensus would sap its credibility, since we would be forced to acknowledge its inablility to abide by one of its basic principles - the principle of consensus contained in rule 18 of the rules of procedure. Austria would therefore be satisfied if the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons were able

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to break out of the unusual situation it found itself in last week when its Chairman stated that the end of negotiations had been reached whereas certain countries held a contrary view. In this context, we should also note that the Ad Hoc Committee's decision on a headquarters for the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons was not obtained by traditional consensus methods.

While stressing Austria's great interest in the finalization of the text of the convention, I have pleasure in introducing two purely technical studies on the question of "capable" facilities. Going beyond the definition in the text submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, which I would describe as political, you will find a scientist's approach to this problem of definition.

At this stage where we have already started talking about the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament, I would also like to pay tribute to the presidency of one of your predecessors, Ambassador García Moritán of the Argentine Republic, who is in fact the next person on the list of speakers today. I would in particular like to welcome what he said on 26 May about the expansion of the membership of this Conference. In the view of my delegation, this subject should be reconsidered seriously at the same time as matters relating to its agenda, which, it should be recalled, dates back to 1979. At that time, the international community had a more rigid structure, was less of a ferment of expectations and had a rather settled membership. Now, if we look at the draft report of the Conference on Disarmament to the forty-seventh General Assembly of the United Nations, we will note inter alia that one of the member States of this Conference no longer exists, namely Yugoslavia, whereas 19 countries are still waiting for full membership. In the case of Austria, the wait has lasted some 10 years now, while reports go on repeating that the Conference duly recognizes the "urgency attached to the question of the expansion of its membership". But we have learned, alas! to read these reports and translate them into more realistic language. Austria has been patient in the past, since we have understood that the composition of this multilateral disarmament body could be explained in terms of the international circumstances of an earlier time. However, today more than ever before, Austria is wondering how far real participation could be useful to it and whether it should not instead concentrate its efforts within CSCE, a body which we think is more efficient, or at least is closer to our immediate interests. We might note that on 4 March the States participating in CSCE adopted the 1992 Vienna Document, in which all confidence-building and security-building measures negotiated to date are reflected. It also contains new agreements on the expanded exchange of information on armed forces and on the lowering of declaration thresholds for military activities. Furthermore and in particular, for the first time military activities are truly restricted and can henceforth be inspected by multinational teams.

The second important document produced by CSCE this year is the Helsinki Document. One of the primary aspects of this document is that it recognizes the importance of mutual support among various European and transatlantic organizations and their cooperation with CSCE with a view to maintaining stability and security. CSCE has declared itself a "regional

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arrangement" in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Contributions from NATO, the Western European Union and the European Community to CSCE peace-keeping operations are henceforth possible. Furthermore, Austria will certainly derive great benefit from pursuing the discussion it has just embarked on with the Western European Union. It will draw its own conclusions as to the possible restructuring of its policy in the field of security.

A priori, Austria has no intention of standing aside from global efforts to promote disarmament and security. We simply feel that in a world where peace and disarmament are mutually linked and indivisible, there can be no reason to exclude one sovereign State rather than another from participating in a joint effort to achieve disarmament and confidence-building.

Austria would be sorry if a universalist view of the world, as expressed in the United Nations Charter, were to take a back seat as continents became more inward-looking. This is why a reorganization of the Disarmament Commission in order to strengthen its impact on the political and military state of affairs in the world seems to us an attractive idea. In the same vein, effective Austrian participation in the Conference on Disarmament will in the future also be tied to the condition that there should be a true political will among all the member countries to accomplish concrete tasks. In this regard, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control - I am referring to item 10 on the Conference's standing agenda - is not at all concrete and, we believe, only helps to encourage the eternal drawing out of fruitless discussions, although, of course, the subject is based on the most noble of ambitions.

We believe, in contrast, that it is better to tackle concrete projects such as the one outlined to this forum on 23 July by Ambassador Hyltenius - that of negotiating a treaty to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities. This would be done separately from work on radiological weapons. Austria, which has no civilian or military nuclear facilities, would like to avoid being the victim of such an attack, which might be directed at one of the nuclear power stations located in a neighbouring country. Consequently it supports Sweden's proposal.

Turning to a subject which several commentators believe will ensure the survival of the Conference on Disarmament, and whose objective we warmly support, namely transparency in armaments, we were very interested to read the draft report on the subject as well as various documents relating to the Tokyo workshop held at the beginning of June 1992. Unfortunately we cannot draw the conclusion that there is a sufficient convergence of views among the members of the Conference. We therefore see no certainty that the efforts made in this field will bear fruit in the foreseeable future.

In order to work on concrete tasks, the Conference on Disarmament could in the future serve as a verification and review body for various conventions which have been in existence for a long time, with a view to making them really effective. The Conference could sit permanently, unlike the ordinary review conferences, which meet only at long intervals. This would constitute

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true progress and would help us to forget that the institutionalization of review work related to the Convention on biological weapons has not proved possible despite the efforts of many countries, including Austria. Apart from the treaty I have just referred to, permanent verification work could be contemplated under article IX of the Antarctic Treaty, article IX of the outer space Treaty, article VII of the seabed Treaty, article VIII of the ENMOD Convention or article 8 of the Convention on certain conventional weapons.

In any event, one area in which it will be intrinsically impossible for any region to turn in on itself, and one to which the Conference on Disarmament must attach priority importance, is that of nuclear testing. We might recall that the explosive force of all nuclear tests carried out since 1945 is equivalent to that of 40 Hiroshima bombs. Far too often these tests have devastating effects on the regions affected. Hence the continuation of nuclear tests seems to us to be irresponsible from both the medical and the environmental viewpoints. In this regard the letter which the President of the French Republic, Mr. François Mitterrand, sent to the heads of State of the other nuclear Powers on 8 April proposing the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is a promising development and the respective commitments of France and the Russian Federation to suspend tests temporarily are encouraging. Nevertheless, there has not yet been any definitive abandonment of these tests - quite the contrary, nuclear explosions follow one after another. The arguments submitted in favour of such tests, namely that they are necessary in order to improve the security systems for nuclear weapons, to check the reliability of stockpiled nuclear warheads and to modernize nuclear arms, are very questionable.

Austria has always been committed to the cessation of all nuclear tests. It ratified the Moscow partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty in 1964 and has always spoken out in favour of United Nations resolutions advocating a total ban. Austria will vigorously maintain this position and will provide support for efforts to conclude a complete nuclear-test-ban treaty - all the more so since on behalf of my Government and by means of this statement I have the honour to transmit to the nuclear powers represented in this forum an appeal from the Chamber of Deputies of the Austrian Parliament, the Nationalrat. This appeal, dated 5 June 1992, calls for an immediate end to all nuclear tests without waiting for the creation of an international commitment to that end. In that context, it therefore goes without saying that we appreciate the study also calling for the cessation of nuclear tests, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by Norway on 1 June in document CD/1151. Echoing Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, we hope that the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will not be too long in coming.

In the statement I made on 13 February last, I had occasion to congratulate those States which had decided to become parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Allow me therefore to welcome the commitment of the United States of America to the indefinite extension of the NPT. We also welcome France's accession to this Treaty 10 days ago. All the permanent members of the Security Council have now become parties to this Treaty which is so vital for the survival of mankind.

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Finally, I would like to join all those who have already expressed their pleasure at the application of the INF Treaty, the conclusion of the START Treaty, the Lisbon Agreements signed on 23 May between Byelorussia, the United States, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, as well as the various Russian and American initiatives to reduce their nuclear weapons as well as the announcements of the same nature made by France, the United Kingdom and NATO. All this constitutes promising progress. I would therefore like to conclude by expressing the hope that the dimunition of the danger of nuclear war made possible by the end of the East-West confrontation will not reduce our vigilence vis-à-vis the many sources of instability which despite everything seem to proliferate throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for the encouragement extended to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): On the first day that you took the Chair, Mr. President, I had occasion to declare our confidence in your new responsibilities. We have had more than one opportunity to see how right our opinion was.

The Conference on Disarmament, as we have been told repeatedly, is a body which prides itself on its traditions. Traditions that are repeated over the years. Some relate to its functioning, with its mechanisms and mysteries of procedure that time and again have proven hard to disentangle. Other traditions relate to the positions which countries and groups repeat every session on the various items on our agenda. This latter tradition, however, would seem doomed to disappear given the scope of the changes on the international political scene. Today, in making my last statement as head of the delegation of the Argentine Republic to this Conference, I wish to recall a tradition which does seem to be observed to the letter, regardless of political change or any amendments to the rules of procedure. The tradition to which I refer is that observed by the vast majority of heads of delegation before they leave this Council Chamber, that of making a brief farewell address.

Over the years distinguished colleagues, freed or feeling freed from the strait-jacket of Government instructions, set out some final reflections before the plenary before they leave. Generally speaking these have tended to reflect, with a greater or lesser degree of irony, a predominant feeling of frustration at the lack of tangible results which is almost a constant of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Today a combination of factors allow me to share these observations with you, imbued with a different spirit from that which might perhaps have underlain any statement I might have made a few years ago. The Conference on Disarmament is finally ready to transmit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an instrument of the importance of the convention on chemical weapons, which, above and beyond the assessment it falls to each of us to make of it, is a genuinely multilateral agreement. On arriving at this Conference on Disarmament I had the great honour to read one of the main instructions which the President of my country gave me on

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taking up the task which today I complete: one of those instructions was to work actively to ensure that the convention on chemical weapons was concluded as soon as possible. Precisely as far as it was able, the Argentine delegation has worked to that end. This chapter, therefore, is beginning to draw to a close.

The Conference finally seems to be parting the heavy curtains of the Council Chamber to become a vital and operational body, a real instrument for world peace and stability. The convention on chemical weapons, the details of which we are now finalizing, will in the coming months ineluctably leave the Geneva circle which gave it birth to move on to the practical terrain of implementation, mainly in The Hague and also in each of our capitals, where the national authorities will breathe life into it by ensuring strict compliance. The convention on chemical weapons is for many of us already part of the negotiating history of this Conference. Other individuals and other groups will now be responsible for it. The void left by the convention on chemical weapons has the merit in a way of obliging the Conference on Disarmament to face the issue of its own future development. This has been mentioned on various occasions in the context of questioning this body's future raison d'être when the bustle in room V has ceased.

This leads us to mention again a matter that was tabled by Argentina here and in New York two years ago: the need to draw up a new operational agenda that can realistically and practically meet the security challenges of the last five years of the century. The recent report prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, entitled "An agenda for peace", reminds us what the circumstances are and what the questions are we have to take up. Today it would seem that the most urgent questions on the international security agenda relate to peace-keeping, transparency in armaments, the nuclear testing issue, the strengthening and consolidation of agreements to eliminate and reduce weapons of mass destruction, and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The topics of a doctrinal type that perhaps could be justified given the oppressive weight of a world divided into blocs seem to have lost their raison d'être in a world where ideological debate, at least for the time being, is no longer a decisive factor in power relationships around the world. What is needed now is to work on the instrumental aspects of security, on specific action that can help prevent emergencies or crises that are destabilizing. Perhaps with the convention on chemical weapons, a pause is now occurring in the era of major disarmament agreements to allow us to move on to follow-up and prevention - a chapter, in our view, which is no less important and pressing. In this context the famous concept of preventive diplomacy might benefit from highly useful support in the Conference on Disarmament. Confidence-building measures, which have been recognized as applicable on land and in outer space, could constitute the point of convergence in the Conference capable of harmonizing experiments already under way in various parts of the world so that universally applicable confidence-building schemes can be drawn up. This conceptual approach can certainly be useful when the Conference moves forward in drawing up practical measures to strengthen openness and transparency in transfers of conventional

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weaponry and dual technologies as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 46/36 L. This is a challenge of a practical nature for the Conference on Disarmament that should in our view be taken up without delay.

The regional approach to disarmament could also be effectively complemented by the multilateral body which once again would be the focal point of convergence of various regional and subregional initiatives in various areas with a view to harmonization. In this regard the organization of interregional crisis prevention and management centres is necessary so that global stability can rest on the pillars of collective action instead of depending on unilateral action by any given dominant force. Moving from the diplomacy of reacting to events to that of prevention will without a doubt call for a good deal of imagination and political vision. Today, when the military alliance has disappeared, when the one remaining is embarking on a thorough analysis of its future activities and redefining itself, the stage seems to be set for a multilateral contribution that can come only from the Conference on Disarmament. So we must take a very serious look at our agenda and go forward boldly on those items where a contribution can be made, while remaining ready to go back when circumstances so allow to topics that at present divide us. The philosophy of "all or nothing" must be banished from a modern body and one which is called on to play an active role in the architecture of a collective security system worthy of the name.

At the beginning of my statement I referred to tradition, and in a way I was really alluding to the past. Today, in saying farewell to this body as head of the delegation of my country, I have done so in the way that I personally prefer: speaking of the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina, who, as he told us in his statement, was addressing our Conference for the last time as representative of his country. Ambassador García Moritán, you are well known to all of us in the field of disarmament, not only in our Conference but also in the other bodies dealing with disarmament problems. You have served the Conference on Disarmament twice as representative of Argentina and occupied posts of great responsibility such as that of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and, more recently, President of our Conference. You chaired the third review conference on the biological weapons Convention and discharged key functions as an officer of several conferences devoted to the problems of international security and disarmament. We can all bear witness to your familiarity with the problems before the Conference and your experience and skill in the sphere of multilateral diplomacy, without of course forgetting your personal qualities and your openness towards all your colleagues. You will leave many friends here in Geneva and a memory which honours your country. On behalf of all of us I wish you every well-merited success in your new diplomatic duties.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Neagu of Romania, who is to introduce the Ad Hoc Committee's report, which has been distributed as CD/1165.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to express the pleasure and satisfaction of the Romanian delegation at seeing you in the Chair at this crucial juncture of the activity of the Conference on Disarmament. Knowing and appreciating your diplomatic skills we are sure that the concluding debates of this session will be most efficiently guided. Meantime I want to convey our congratulations to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador O'Sullivan, for the excellent work that he has done as President of the Conference.

I have the honour to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which covers the activity of the Committee during this year (CD/1165). In accordance with the mandate given to it by the Conference, the Committee has continued to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, taking into account the existing agreements as well as the relevant proposals, initiatives and developments since the establishment of the Committee in 1985.

We have used all the possibilities at our disposal in order to explore the subject and come up with substantive conclusions. Thus we held both official debates and informal consultations in an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect, for which I want to thank all participating delegations, and especially the group coordinators - Mr. Anastasov for the Eastern European Group, Mr. Gevers for the Western Group and Mr. Karem for the Group of 21 - as well as the representatives of China.

I would like to pay a special tribute to the Friends of the Chair: the Hon. Anthony Monckton, of the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Dr. Mahmoud Karem, of the delegation of Egypt, and Col. Gyorgy Diachenko, of the delegation of the Russian Federation, who respectively conducted open-ended consultations on the following important subjects: terminological aspects related to prevention of an arms race in outer space; issues related to verification of ASATs; and confidence-building measures in space activities.

The Committee also benefited from the scientific and technical contributions of experts from the delegations of Canada, Chechoslovakia, India, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany, to whom I want to express my sincere appreciation. I am most grateful to Ambassador Vicente Berasategui for his very thoughtful advice, and Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov for his impeccable work as Secretary of the Committee.

As was only normal, during our deliberations, different, sometimes even opposing, views were expressed. The Committee succeeded, however, as is underlined in the report, in advancing "in its efforts to identify areas of convergence suitable for more structured work". But much remains to be done in the future in order to really achieve the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Therefore we submit the proposal that substantive work on this agenda item should continue at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The report recommends that the Conference should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1993 session, taking into account all relevant factors, including the work of the Committee since 1985.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for introducing its report and for the kind words of encouragement he addressed to the Chair. It is my intention to submit this report to the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 18 August. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Mr. Wadhwa, who will speak on behalf of Ambassador Shah in his capacity as special coordinator on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban"

Mr. WADHWA (India): Mr. President, the delegation of India is extremely pleased to see you presiding over our work in this crucial period, and we wish you well in your important task. First of all, I would like to apologise on behalf of Ambassador Shah, who was supposed to report today personally on his efforts as special coordinator for agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", but has been unable to attend this plenary meeting due to other urgent commitments elsewhere in the Palais. Allow me, on his behalf, to read out the following report of the special coordinator on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban".

At the Conference's 612th plenary meeting on 13 February 1992, the President of the Conference appointed me as special coordinator to seek agreement on organizational arrangements for agenda item 1. During the course of the three sessions of the CD this year, I have carried out active and intensive consultations with delegations, bilaterally and through open-ended meetings, to ensure that there would be agreement among all delgations to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate acceptable to all. A series of proposals on a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee's re-establishment were put forward and considered, along with a proposal for a programme of work for the 1992 session, which for some delgations was an important component of the package. Throughout these consultations, I found a general agreement among all delegations to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee this year and to start its work quickly. The growing importance of agenda item 1 was recognized by all delegations.

An overwhelming majority of delegations expressed willingness to give a mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee to continue, as a step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues. A growing number of delegations felt that the Conference on Disarmament must immediately begin serious and sustained consideration of agenda item 1, particularly in the light of the conclusion of negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. While substantial progress was made on improving the previous mandate, no final agreement has been possible up to now. It is my hope that the results achieved so far this year will not be lost sight of when efforts are continued next year to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its 1993 session. In view of the overwhelming interest in this item among the members of the CD, I would

(Mr. Wadhwa, India)

recommend that the CD re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1993 session and make urgent efforts towards a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Dahlman, to introduce the Ad Hoc Group's progress report contained in document CD/1163.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I am pleased to report today on the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group held from 27 July to 7 August 1992 and attended by experts and representatives from 27 countries, and to introduce document CD/1163 containing the Group's progress report.

The work of the Ad Hoc Group has during the last years been concentrated on the conduct and the evaluation of the Group's second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2). The Group is now about to finalize the reporting of this successful undertaking. A summary of the main results was presented to the CD earlier this year in CD/1144.

At this session the Group completed five quite voluminous appendices to this report. These appendices, which are an integral part of the Group's sixth report, contain a detailed account of the test and of the scientific and technical results obtained. This information will be useful for the Group's further work. Due to their technical nature the appendices will not be circulated within the CD but kept as documents of the Group and be available through the secretariat. The secretariat has as always done excellent work in supporting the Group.

The seismological evaluation is now the only remaining item of GSETT-2 to be reported on. This evaluation requires considerable effort and access to reference material for the actual test period provided by scientific institutes around the world. The Group continued its discussion of this issue and agreed to focus the seismological evaluation on the detection and location capabilities achieved during GSETT-2. The Group plans to finalize a report on this evaluation at its next session.

The backbone of the Group's work is results from national investigations conducted in individual countries or in cooperation between countries. Some 40 reports on such investigations were presented during the session. I will choose a few examples from this important flow of information.

Several investigations illustrated the high detection and location capabilities obtained by national or regional networks of seismological stations. Such networks can, as will be discussed later, be useful also in the context of global monitoring.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The detection capabilities of individual stations are critically dependent on the prevailing background disturbances or noise at the actual site. Based on data obtained from GSETT-2 a thorough investigation of the noise situation at stations around the globe was presented. This showed a most significant variation between sites and clearly illustrated the importance of selecting the sites carefully to obtain seismological stations with high performance.

In addition to detecting individual events that occur it might, in a monitoring situation, be important to know that no events above a certain level have occurred in a given region during a specific time period. A national investigation described a method to estimate the actual monitoring capability of a certain region from the analysis of continuously available noise data.

In my last example of national contributions, satellite photos were used to pinpoint the precise locations of open-pit mines from which seismological signals were recorded, thereby helping in calibrating the seismological observations. This illustrates the usefulness of combining various technologies in developing a monitoring system.

The Group devoted most of its efforts during the session to discussing the reassessment of the concept of the global monitoring system described in its fifth report (CD/903). The discussions were focused on the overall design of the system and provided a basis and an outline for the Group's future work.

The Group noted that many of the results and experiences obtained in GSETT-2 will be important in reassessing the overall concept of the system and its various components. Some of the more important are as follows.

First, the need for a network with adequate global coverage of high-quality stations, especially arrays. GSETT-2 showed a strong regional variation in detection and location capabilities reflecting not only the uneven station distribution but also strong variation in station sensitivities and capabilities. The seismic arrays again proved to be most useful.

Second, the need to take into account information from local and regional seismic networks; such modern and high-performance networks are today operating in many parts of the globe and could provide information of great importance for a global monitoring system.

Third, the future use of only one international data centre (IDC) in the global system; during GSETT-2 four experimental IDCs were used, which provided valuable experience. Technical and other developments not only make it possible but also desirable to use only one IDC to serve the future system.

Fourth, the need to improve and automate analysis procedures. GSETT-2 provided the EIDCs with a large amount of wave-form or level II data. The full potential of these comprehensive recordings was not fully utilized during the test due to lack of adequate analysis methods and procedures.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

Over the last decade, scientific and technological developments have been significant not only in seismology, but also in information technology, an area of great importance for global seismological monitoring systems. The Group firmly believes that the design of the global system should fully utilize recent developments in science and technology. The Group identified the following areas as being important for the overall system concept: the rapid developments in global telecommunication, making high-speed communication available globally; the general availability of high-performance computers and methods and procedures for data management and analysis; and finally, the developments in regional seismology, i.e., that based on seismological observations at distances of less than 2,000 km, making it possible to fully utilize data from national and regional networks.

In considering preliminary design concepts the Group also tentatively discussed the various products that might be available to the users from alternative system designs. Although this question requires further consideration, the Group noted that it would be desirable to estimate the detection, location and identification capabilities of alternative system designs. It further considers that the issues of redundancy, data authenticity, reliability and security are important.

As to the overall conceptual design, the Group agreed on the following tentative framework for studying design options. In its work so far the Group has been focusing on a global network of some 50 stations as the basis of the system. The Group is now considering alternative global networks of high-quality arrays and single stations. The networks should be modelled based on the results of the best stations in operation during GSETT-2. The number of stations in the networks could be extended or reduced to demonstrate networks of varying sensitivity. By estimating costs for each alternative network a cost-capability relation for the monitoring systems might be illustrated. The global network should be complemented by national and regional networks primarily used to report on seismic events occurring within their territories.

The system should contain only one international data centre. This should be built on the experience gained at the four experimental IDCs operated so far. Special efforts should be made to improve quality control, automation and procedures for wave-form analysis. The IDC should be able to receive and process continuous wave-form data should that prove to be valuable.

The Ad Hoc Group established nine working groups of participating experts to elaborate on the following topics relevant to the design of the global system: overall concepts, station design, site selection, network studies, seismological procedures, establishment of a single international data centre, communications, interaction by the IDC with national and regional networks, and cost estimates. These working groups became actively engaged during the session in defining their main tasks, which should be elaborated on between now and the Group's next session.

The Canadian delegation has invited GSE experts to a workshop in November 1992. This will provide a valuable opportunity to continue discussions within and among the working groups.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of a similar informal technical workshop by Australia in Canberra from 27 April to 1 May 1992, which proved useful in evaluation of the results of GSETT-2.

The Group has on earlier occasions benefited from technical discussions with international organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization and INMARSAT, and representatives from these organizations have participated in the Group's meetings as observers at the invitation of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Group now considers it to be useful to share with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the GSE technical concepts for the global exchange of seismic data in order to determine if IAEA has particular technologies or experiences that might be useful to the Group in its work. To this end, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that, without any financial implications to the Conference, IAEA should be invited to send an observer to attend the Ad Hoc Group's next session.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 15 to 26 February 1993.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for introducing the Group's report. I shall put before the Conference for decision at our next plenary meeting the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 of the report concerning the dates of the Group's next session.

We have now come to the end of the list of speakers. Are there any other delegations that would like to take the floor? Mr. Siahaan of Indonesia, you have the floor.

Mr. SIAHAAN (Indonesia): I take the floor on behalf of the Group of 21 to place on record our disappointment concerning the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", this year. This failure occurs despite the renewed effort to that end, the improved international political climate and the overwhelming endorsement in the United Nations General Assembly of the call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The Group of 21 has consistently advocated and attached utmost importance to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Bringing an end to nuclear tests for weapons purposes is the most urgent and crucial issue in the field of disarmament. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is long overdue. The Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body in this field has the primary role in carrying out negotiations to achieve this objective.

(Mr. Siahaan, Indonesia)

Today we note the progress achieved by the signing of the INF Treaty, the START Treaty, as well as unilateral measures and the recent agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to make significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of their two countries. These are positive developments, but these could not make a CTBT less essential. Besides, bilateral and multilateral efforts should be complementary.

The conclusion of a CTBT will be a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons as well as preventing their proliferation. Proliferation in all its aspects must be stopped, and nuclear weapons cannot be considered as a legitimate source or means to enhance the political status of countries. Moreover, a CTBT would also help to alleviate the concern about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing.

It is encouraging to note that the Russian Federation and France have announced voluntary moratoriums on testing. The Group of 21 urgently calls on the other three nuclear Powers to make similar commitments and expects all nuclear Powers to then continue with the moratoriums until the actual treaty is signed and ratified.

As has been repeatedly demonstrated in the past, in this year's session of the CD the Group of 21 has shown flexibility in the search for a consensus on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee as evidenced by the various proposals put forward to that end. But the Conference on Disarmament has met with a setback in this regard, as a result of the obstacles laid down by certain nuclear Powers belonging to one group, despite the willingness of the vast majority of the members of the Conference on Disarmament to engage in serious negotiations. The flexibility of the Group of 21 on the draft mandate should not be misconstrued. It will not be useful to re-establish a subsidiary body if it will not be able to achieve its objective. To ensure progress in its work towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty at an early date, the subsidiary body should be provided with an adequate negotiating mandate.

In conclusion, the Group of 21 urges that the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament with an adequate negotiating mandate.

Mr. HLAING (Myanmar): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the CD for this month? I also wish to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, for the effective manner in which he steered the work of the CD during his tenure of presidency. I should also like to welcome to our midst Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya and Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski of Poland who have just joined us in the CD.

In my statement in the plenary on 25 June I dwelt on the question of chemical weapons. In my statement today I should like to touch upon nuclear issues on the agenda of the CD. In recent years we have witnessed dramatic transformations in the international political climate, in the relationship

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

between the major military Powers and in the strategic landscape of the world. The cold war has become a thing of the past and has given way to new patterns of relationship and cooperation between the major groups of countries. This has generated favourable conditions for arms limitation and disarmament and has indeed led to a number of significant agreements on arms limitation and disarmament such as the INF and START treaties as well as the unilateral steps taken by the United States and the Russian Federation to eliminate land-based short-range nuclear weapons. We hope that such a favourable international political climate will lend added impetus to the negotiations in the CD on nuclear issues.

A number of significant developments which have a direct bearing on the question of a nuclear test ban have taken place recently. These include, inter alia, the following:

The number of nuclear tests by the nuclear-weapon States has significantly declined in the post-cold-war era;

Some nuclear-weapon States have recently announced a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests;

The announcement by France of her decision to ratify additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the announcement made by the French delegation that it will participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban when the Ad Hoc Committee is re-established.

It is regrettable that, while a number of significant developments having a direct bearing on this question have taken place recently, the CD should find itself unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during the 1992 session. We hope that the CD will be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with an adequate negotiating mandate to commence its substantive work at an early date in its 1993 session.

The CD has been holding informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3 for the past several years. My delegation feels that in the light of the aforementioned positive developments we should take a fresh look at these agenda items and see whether it will be possible to adopt a more effective format for dealing with these important questions. We believe that, at the very least, discussions on agenda items 2 and 3 should be well structured so that delegations may be able to address the key issues related to these questions in depth and in a more goal-oriented manner.

My delegation attaches great importance to all the nuclear issues on the agenda of the CD. Not the least among them is agenda item 6, on negative security assurances. My delegation firmly believes that the major changes in the international political climate and the subsequent positive developments have provided a very good opportunity to take a fresh look at the question of NSA. As we are fully aware, the notion of NSA goes as far back as the late 1960s. The consideration of this agenda item in the CD through all those years has not been fruitful. We believe that it is now high time to address

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

this issue in a serious and businesslike manner. We hope that we will be able to further pursue substantive in-depth discussions on this important issue during next year's annual session of the CD.

Mr. FELICIO (Brazil): Mr. President, since this is the first intervention of my delegation under your presidency, let me congratulate you on your assumption of your functions at this important juncture. At the meeting at which Ambassador García Moritán has addressed the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament for the last time before returning to Buenos Aires, where other important duties await him, I could not miss the opportunity of joining you in the words you addressed to him. I might add that this Conference will miss Ambassador García Moritán, this outstanding diplomat of Argentina and close friend of us all. The diplomatic skills and personal friendship of Ambassador García Moritán with the Brazilian authorities played a fundamental role in the bilateral understandings of our two countries in the nuclear field. I am proud to have participated with Ambassador García Moritán in that exercise, during which I could admire him and learn with him. I wish him all success in his future endeavours.

Briefly let me revert to the presentation of the report by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in charge of considering international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. In paragraph 14 of the report of that Group it is suggested that IAEA should be invited to send an observer to attend its next session. It is the understanding of my delegation that IAEA will be invited to share the experience it might have on technical aspects of data management and transmission. May I suggest that when the invitation is addressed to IAEA it be done in those precise terms? I would also suggest that, when addressing the invitation to IAEA, it should be referred to by its proper name of International Atomic Energy Agency, and not "authority" as the Agency is called in the report.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Felício, not only for your comments on the IAEA but also for the words of encouragement you addressed to me, as indeed did Ambassador Hlaing a little earlier, and I think that I may thank you on behalf of Ambassador García Moritán for the really very kind words you addressed to him. As the last speaker who asked for the floor I have the representative of Chile, Mr. González.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, since this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor with you in the Chair of this Conference, we should like to congratulate you most particularly on taking up this important post, bearing in mind not only your acknowledged professional skills but the special ties of friendship between Chile and your country.

This morning we were disagreeably surprised to hear the announcement made by the distinguished friend, and I emphasize the word friend, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán concerning the ending of his tenure as representative of his country in this Conference. Apart from the ties of friendship that unite us with Ambassador García Moritán we feel it is right to emphasize that his contribution in the Conference on

(Mr. González, Chile)

Disarmament has been professionally and technically speaking of the highest value and has helped to bring about an atmosphere of greater trust, greater predictability in relations between States on this subject and at the same time he has carried forward a number of initiatives together with other Latin American countries, and specifically my country, which we certainly particularly appreciate. We should therefore like to state explicitly for the record that Ambassador García Moritán's departure is a matter of regret to the delegation of Chile and we hope that we will be able to work with him and continue to work with him on these subjects, in some other place. Ambassador García Moritán in his farewell statement gave us a rapid and conceptual analysis of the need to restructure the Conference on Disarmament's agenda, something to which my country attaches the highest importance. Some of the points he raised, if not all, are of particular importance for Chile, such as a halt to nuclear testing and the building of a greater climate of trust in general. In this regard we should like to recall that it was the distinguished delegation of Argentina, and specifically Ambassador García Moritán, who a few years back submitted an initiative for the creation of a climate of encouragement in confidence-building measures under the item on prohibition of an arms race in outer space, a topic of crucial importance, bearing in mind the fact that a number of events have come about which it is really important to settle, such as that related to space debris, for example, and the subsequent need to reformulate or recast certain articles of the registration Convention. Finally, on similar lines, we should like to reiterate what we have already said on two occasions in this forum, concerning the possibility our country is considering of holding, together with other Latin American countries, a Latin American conference in Santiago on mutual confidence-building measures, which to our mind is absolutely consistent with what has been said earlier.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. González, who spoke on behalf of Chile and also thanked Ambassador García Moritán and myself. I am very happy to receive such encouragement. I propose now, if there are no further speakers on the list who wish to take the floor, that we should proceed to the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1160, which was introduced to you last week. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference adopts this report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have asked the secretariat to distribute today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. May I take it that the Conference adopts the timetable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): At the request of Ambassador Zahran, the special coordinator for agenda item 9, entitled "Transparency in armaments", I would like to inform you that he will be holding informal consultations with the coordinators and other interested delegations on the draft annual report to the General Assembly in conference room I as soon as this plenary is over.

I have no further business on the agenda for today, and I therefore propose to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday, 18 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.632
18 August 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 18 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Michel Servais (Belgium)

GE.92-62653/0432K (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 632nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, today I plan to submit to the Conference for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, contained in document CD/1165, as well as the recommendation appearing in paragraph 15 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which has already been circulated as document CD/1163.

On the speakers' list today I have the representatives of Japan and Indonesia. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that under your able guidance we will conclude this year's session successfully and I would like to assure you of the full support and cooperation of my delegation.

I have asked for the floor to make the following statement on behalf of the Western Group.

Last Thursday, we listened to the report of Ambassador Shah, special coordinator for agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". We would like to express our sincere appreciation to Ambassador Shah for his untiring efforts in the search for agreement to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB.

We also heard a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 on this issue, to which I wish to refer briefly.

The Western Group also regrets that it has not been possible to agree on establishing an Ad Hoc Committee during this session of the CD. We also attach great importance to the issue of an NTB, and we wanted to see this Ad Hoc Committee re-established as early as possible. Last year we did useful work with an adequate mandate and we wanted to continue substantive work in the Ad Hoc Committee this year.

However, this year's experience has shown that if discussions on a mandate are allowed to become too protracted the true objective, substantive work on the agenda item, can be lost.

This year, we witnessed important developments in the field of nuclear testing, which should have been discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee. We regret all the more the failure to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee in that, with the participation of all five nuclear-weapon States, after France's decision to join, the work in the Committee could have been particularly useful.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB will be re-established at the beginning of the 1993 session with a mandate acceptable to all delegations, and we hope that this year's annual report of the CD will reflect such an intention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your kind words and encouragement, and for your statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. Your wide experience and great diplomatic skill, as well as your other personal qualities, offer a solid guarantee of the success of our work. I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, who chaired the Conference in an outstanding manner up to the beginning of this month.

(continued in English)

The sessions of the Conference on Disarmament this year are taking place in an encouraging, albeit still fragile, global environment, offering better opportunities. The East-West conflict and its world corollaries - ideological rivalry and bloc politics, military confrontation and competition for spheres of influence - no longer dominate the international landscape and there has been a marked broadening and deepening of the dimensions of disarmament. Beyond the mere regulation of armaments and the arms race, disarmament agreements now include the destruction of existing arsenals as well as limiting future production. In this connection, it is heartening for us to note that important steps have indeed been taken toward the objective and purposes of nuclear disarmament.

We have witnessed a number of major disarmament achievements such as the completion of the INF Treaty, the signing of the START agreement, unilateral declarations made by a number of nuclear Powers to further reduce nuclear armaments, as well as the Washington agreement concluded by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin to make further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries. In the same vein our hopes for further progress have been bolstered by the recent accession to the non-proliferation Treaty of two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, the intention of new republics in the former Soviet Union to follow suit and the adoption by France of a moratorium on nuclear testing.

However, it would be definitely wrong to allow this positive spirit of optimism to fall into the trap of negative complacency because, despite the general improvement of the situation at the global level, political will is still wanting and progress is still lacking on efforts to protect non-nuclear States against the use, or the threat of the use, of nuclear weapons. Strategic doctrines continue to cast their shadow across the globe, while the

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

world is still threatened by existing nuclear arsenals which are being further refined through continued dangerous testing. Furthermore, as has often been said, we should not lose sight of the deeper causes of unrest, simmering discontent and violent conflict that still ravage some regions of the world. Compounding the difficulty, there is the outbreak of new rivalries which have rekindled age-old fears and enmities. As acknowledged by the summit meeting of the Security Council last January, "change, however welcome, has brought new risks for stability and security".

In the midst of such a precarious situation, my delegation is gratified to note major developments taking place in our own region, South-East Asia, which are certainly having an important influence and a positive impact on the security of the region. The first major development is, without doubt, the signing, last October, of the Paris agreements on the comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. In spite of the difficulties presently encountered, Indonesia continues to firmly believe that only the Paris agreements can ensure the restoration of peace in Cambodia. Therefore we feel it absolutely imperative that all the Cambodian factions should stand by their commitment to all the provisions of these agreements, and that the international community should maintain its unwavering support for the mission of UNTAC. As the Indonesian Foreign Minister recently stated, "We cannot allow the unravelling of the Paris agreements without condemning the Cambodian people to more suffering and more bloodshed. Neither can we condone the reinterpretation, by any party to the agreements, of some of their provisions. The agreements should now be upheld in their balanced totality."

The second important development is the accession of Viet Nam and Laos to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. Indeed this accession represents an important act of confidence-building which, we believe, will further widen and strengthen the framework of cooperation on regional security already in place, and make it even more effective for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, it is encouraging to note that those two important developments have created an improved climate, conducive to the pursuance of ASEAN's undiminished attachment to the vision of a ZOPFAN (zone of peace, freedom and neutrality), as well as a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. In this context my delegation attaches great importance to the reconvening of the ASEAN Working Group on those subjects and looks forward to the successful completion of its work.

At the last ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila two weeks ago, the attention of Ministers was drawn to the South China Sea, an area perceived to be endowed with an untapped wealth of natural resources but, at the same time, a source of potential conflict due to overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction over particular islands and marine areas. Not being itself a claimant, and yet belonging to the region, Indonesia has for quite some time paid serious attention to this problem. We have taken the initiative of organizing three successive workshops in Bandung, Bali and most recently in Jogjakarta, gathering government officials in their personal capacities, scholars and technical experts from the region in an attempt to help manage this potential conflict by translating it into an opportunity for cooperation.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

From those three workshops a proposition has emerged to the effect that, pending the resolution of sovereignty and territorial disputes, the littoral States could nevertheless already engage in mutually beneficial collaborative activities that would not prejudice their respective claims. Therefore we are satisfied that such a proposition found reflection in the ASEAN declaration on the South China Sea adopted very recently in Manila, which:

(a) Emphasizes the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;

(b) Urges all parties concerned to exercise restraint, with a view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes;

(c) Resolves, without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in the South China Sea relating to the safety of maritime navigation and communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment, coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs;

(d) Commends all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea.

After a long and extremely painstaking negotiation process, the Conference on Disarmament is now approaching the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Ambassador von Wagner and the delegation of Germany for their hard work to finalize the draft for possible adoption by the forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. Being a country which has never possessed nor had the intention of acquiring or developing chemical weapons, Indonesia has from the very beginning attached great importance to the early and successful conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, both as a position of principle and as a matter of real interest. This serious commitment was translated in the most concrete manner when recently the Indonesian delegation demonstrated its readiness to exercise flexibility on its strongly held position regarding pertinent issues still pending.

However, it would be less than candid for my delegation not to say that, despite the strenuous efforts made by all involved in the negotiation, the pre-final version of the draft convention still leaves some points of concern to us, particularly on the practicability and implementability of the verification time-frames. For a country like Indonesia, which is remote from the headquarters of the organization, with difficult geographical conditions, and which is still in the process of developing transport and communication infrastructure, the relatively short time-frames for the conduct of on-site

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

inspections could very well become an impediment for the proper implementation of the convention. Unless a certain understanding to overcome this problem is made, such countries as ours will be put in a disadvantaged position when they become parties to the convention. We therefore still hope that appropriate ways and means can be found to address this legitimate concern and to resolve this practical problem.

Now that the negotiation on the chemical weapons convention is approaching completion, a pertinent question that springs to mind is how the Conference on Disarmament will function as a negotiating forum in the future. We find it an unfortunate irony that the improving situation in the international scene fails to find reflection in the work of the CD. It is indeed disheartening for us to note from this year's balance sheet that, except for the work on the chemical weapons convention, almost no progress has been registered on the rest of the agenda. We are particularly disappointed with the failure of the Conference to establish this year an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. My delegation continues to believe that the prompt realization of a comprehensive test ban is indispensable for the effective prevention, not only of the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also of environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear explosions.

It is thus evident that in order to revitalize the Conference on Disarmament and to make its work more effective, an exercise of soul-searching is urgently needed. Such an exercise in our view should be conducted even before members start wasting precious time and scarce resources through quarrels on the agenda, the establishment of ad hoc committees and the elaboration of their respective mandates, at the beginning of next year's session. For its part my delegation stands ready to participate and cooperate in such endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Brotodiningrat for his statement and his words of encouragement to the Chair. I have now reached the end of the list of speakers for this morning. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? None does.

I now put before the Conference for decision the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, contained in document CD/1165. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts this report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I warmly congratulate the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the adoption of a report dealing with a particularly delicate and complex matter. Ambassador Neagu performed the task we entrusted to him with a degree of skill and diplomatic experience which constitute a valuable asset for all our work.

(The President)

I suggest that we should now move to the adoption of the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, concerning the dates of the next session of the Group, which proposes to meet between 15 and 26 February 1993. May I take it that the Conference adopts this recommendation?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): In accordance with the timetable of meetings for this week, immediately after Thursday's plenary meeting, the Conference will hold informal consultations, naturally with interpretation services, on outstanding issues related to the drafting of our annual report to the General Assembly. Specifically, it will examine the paragraphs relating to agenda items 1, 2 and 3. As was decided at last week's presidential consultations, the paragraphs relating to item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban", will be circulated to the special coordinator appointed by the Conference on this agenda item, Ambassador Shah, the representative of India, and to the group coordinators, for preliminary study before the informal consultations. The paragraphs of the annual report dealing with agenda item 9, "Transparency in armaments", will be considered under the chairmanship of the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran, who will hold an informal meeting on Thursday morning immediately after our consultations on items 1, 2 and 3. I very much hope that we will complete our work on the annual report by the end of this week, so as to enable the secretariat to prepare the revised version of the report. I am also counting on cooperation on the part of delegations participating in the consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, who are to meet for the last time on Thursday at 3 p.m. precisely.

We have now reached the end of the agenda, and so I will adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 20 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.633
20 August 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Michel Servais (Belgium)

GE.92-62674/0515K (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 633rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Italy, the United States of America and India. And straight away I give the floor to my friend and colleague, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to thank you very much and to pay tribute to the cheerful and effective simplicity with which you perform your duties to the Conference on Disarmament and within the Western Group. Allow me also to extend my gratitude to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, above all for his friendship, and for his always subtle and pertinent advice that helped me and will help the Conference to identify more clearly the path it is to follow. My gratitude extends to all his valuable and dedicated staff at the various levels of the secretariat.

In returning here to Geneva to take leave of all of you, I wondered whether the priority responsibility of the CD during these decisive days for the chemical weapons convention would justify the indulgence of a few moments away from the substance to focus on a farewell, particularly as I have no particular inspiration to share; I am not engaged in some important event, but I have been away from a town, an activity, a group of colleagues and friends of whom I was fond. So I have no final message to deliver, none that would depart from the day-to-day experience of a painstaking search for points of convergence, in this very room, or in the committees, groups and subgroups of the Conference on Disarmament. It is there, and not when one is casting off the moorings, that the hope for a less well-armed and therefore more secure world is realized or, on the contrary, collapses. Nevertheless, this ritual of ours, of greetings and appreciation to those who arrive or are leaving, this meticulous attention to courtesy, are they not intrinsically an indication of the style with which we would like international relations to be increasingly imbued? For even today, through one of the destructive processes of assimilation that are inherent in nationalism, there are shortcomings that we strive every day to overcome in our personal relations that are transformed into virtues once they are placed at the service of what is considered to be the higher interest of our own countries. Thus, from my three years spent in the CD, I will take away with me first and foremost the pleasant memory of general kindness characterizing our negotiations, even the most difficult ones, and the hope that this is not just an exercise in style, but a genuine effort to bring the code of conduct among States closer to the far more refined code which prevails among individuals.

Given the dramatic and unexpected developments in certain regions of Europe, we are compelled to acknowledge that there is no region of the world that can be described as exemplary or considered totally free from irrational and deadly armed violence. Hence we must regrettably recognize how difficult it is for the international community to identify and implement the appropriate responses when the fire has already spread, whether we are speaking of armed violence or the scandal of the death of whole populations through famine, often as a result of such violence; or when we seek to restore the international rule of law that has been flouted. It is for that reason

(Mr. Negrotto Cambiaso, Italy)

that I wish to reaffirm once again, on behalf of my country and on my own behalf, my full confidence in the role of the Conference on Disarmament, a role that is both major and pressing. We are convinced that this Conference, if its membership and responsibilities are updated, will be able to make a major contribution to laying the groundwork for the prevention of certain tragedies: by providing the international community with a preventive network of specific arrangements and above all by giving its organs effective and credible means of monitoring their implementation. As we have often repeated in respect of chemical weapons, the same approach applies, in our view, to the urgent monitoring of the transfer, production and stockpiling of weapons by international bodies; to outer space, where international measures to monitor its utilization, and even certain limitations on that utilization, now seem possible and necessary; to the nuclear test ban, where the time lost this year must be made up in the very near future, in keeping with the progress announced or achieved in the reduction of stockpiles, as well as widespread expectations on the part of the public.

I would have liked to experience with you and all my colleagues and friends in the CD the phase in which the chemical weapons convention was finalized. The impermanence of our status as nomads prevents me from doing so. That is why, as I say goodbye to you today, I mean above all au revoir, until we meet again soon in Paris, for the signature of the chemical weapons convention, where I very much hope I will see all the friends, without exception, that I was fortunate enough to meet here or in New York, with whom it was possible and agreeable, day after day, to achieve an important and promising result; an experience which will remain among the finest memories of my professional career.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso for his kind words addressed to me and particularly for the statement he has just made and the wishes he addressed to our Conference for the successful conclusion of the negotiations on chemical weapons. Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso has just delivered his last statement on behalf of his country. He represented Italy for approximately three years, during which he discharged his duties with remarkable diplomatic skill and talent, in the best traditions of the Farnesina. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons with the professional qualities that I have just emphasized, and with his personal qualities which we have all been able to appreciate. He also participated very decisively this year in the negotiations on the draft convention prohibiting chemical weapons, in his capacity as coordinator for the Group of Western Countries. He leaves us now to take up very weighty duties in his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a responsibility which implies uncommon distinction. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso and his family every success in their future activities, and I assure him of my friendship. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, you modestly say it's only an accident of alphabet that brings you the the head chair. Nevertheless it is a most fortuitous accident from our point of view to have your sage and expert leadership as President of the Conference on Disarmament at this critical month when we bring to a close our work on a convention to ban chemical weapons. May I join you in bidding farewell and good wishes to our friend Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso, who is moving upward to a very important position in Rome?

I am digressing today from our most important CWC goal for a few moments to consider agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". The United States fully concurred with the statement of the Western Group read by Ambassador Tanaka on 18 August. However, the absence this year of any meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has deprived the United States, as well as other nations, of the opportunity to make its contributions in that body. Therefore, I must try to compress today in a few sentences what we would have elaborated in detail in meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, had it been formed.

We intended, for example, to build upon the excellent exchange of last year on nuclear testing - why testing takes place; its relationship, if any, to nuclear non-proliferation; its verifiability; and many other topics. We also planned to comment on the implications for nuclear testing of the dramatic changes brought about by the START Treaty, the 17 June 1992 Joint Understanding on further strategic reductions, and other steps taken by States of the former Soviet Union and the United States. These changes will reduce the nuclear forces to less than one third of the 1990 level. We also wanted to review recent changes to the nuclear testing policy of the United States. Time no longer permits us to do that in detail; consequently, I am setting forth only the main points.

First, the purpose of all United States underground nuclear testing is to evaluate and improve the safety of the nuclear stockpile, and to maintain the reliability of our sharply reduced nuclear deterrent. This will be a continuing requirement as long as the need for a nuclear deterrent exists.

Second, the United States will conduct only the minimum number of tests necessary for these purposes. We now anticipate not more than six tests per year over the next five years. This level is a small fraction of the numbers of tests conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s.

And third, the United States will limit the yield of nuclear tests to the minimum necessary. We now anticipate not more than three tests per year in excess of 35 kilotons.

Unfortunately, despite the painstaking efforts of our exceptionally capable colleague from India, the activities of the Conference on Disarmament with respect to an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban were a model of how not to do business. The 13 August statement of the Group of 21 alleges that certain nuclear Powers of the Western Group laid down obstacles to re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee. This is simply untrue. The position of both the United Kingdom and the United States - that the time is not right for

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

a negotiating mandate for the Committee - is well known to everyone. The United States reluctantly engaged in discussions to try to change last year's mandate, which was perfectly serviceable, in hopes that minor changes could lead to the establishing of the Committee.

It is now perfectly clear that no programme of work and no changes in the mandate would have enjoyed consensus. If those very few States that could not accept the mandate of last year had simply said that there was no point in having a committee without a negotiating mandate, we could have saved ourselves many wasted hours spent posturing over a programme of work and tinkering with the wording of a mandate.

The United States and nearly all other members of the CD believed that a structured dialogue on nuclear testing would have benefited the Conference; one or two other States did not so believe. In the future, let us spare ourselves the futility of empty shadow-boxing over procedure. Let us be candid enough to set aside issues where we have unbridgeable differences, and focus on those issues that promise success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your kind and encouraging words to me, and for the statement you have just made, of which note will be taken. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Shah.

Mr. SHAH (India): Mr. President, my delegation has already had occasion to congratulate you on your ongoing presidency of the Conference. We are pleased to note that, as expected, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is proceeding smoothly under your able guidance.

I have asked for the floor today to inform all delegations present at the Conference on Disarmament that a "Joint declaration on complete prohibition of chemical weapons" was signed by India and Pakistan at New Delhi on Wednesday, 19 August 1992 by the two Foreign Secretaries. In anticipation of the early conclusion of the negotiation of a multilateral global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament, you will recall that India had proposed a bilateral agreement with Pakistan last year and at the previous round of the Foreign-Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan, it was agreed to consider issuing a joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is my pleasure to inform the Conference on Disarmament that under the "Joint declaration on complete prohibition of chemical weapons" signed yesterday, India and Pakistan have undertaken never under any circumstances to develop, produce or otherwise acquire chemical weapons; never to use chemical weapons or to assist, encourage or induce anyone in any way to engage in the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons. Both countries have reiterated their resolve to become original States parties to the proposed convention. They have undertaken to cooperate with each other in finalizing and adopting a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, which would ensure the security of all States and encourage the full utilization of

(Mr. Shah, India)

achievements in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes, especially of economic development of developing countries. They would exercise their right to develop their chemical industry and related applications and products only for peaceful purposes and for the welfare of their peoples. Reaffirming their respective unilateral declarations on non-possession of chemical weapons and their respective commitments to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and recalling the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly upholding the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the two sides have expressed their conviction that a complete and effective prohibition on chemical weapons will contribute to the security of all States and have reiterated the need for the early conclusion within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament of a global convention towards this end. Through this "Joint declaration", the two countries have reaffirmed their commitment to durable peace and the development of friendly and harmonious relations and recognize the role of such confidence-building measures in promoting bilateral relations based on mutual trust and goodwill.

While I have the floor, Mr. President, let me add my personal voice to the tribute you have just paid to Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso, who will be leaving us soon. We are sorry to see him go but happy that he will assume even greater responsibilities in his country. I wish him all the best in his future work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for the kind words you addressed to me and for the very important statement you have just made. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? The delegation of the United Kingdom - Sir Michael, you have the floor.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, let me begin by joining those who have expressed their pleasure at seeing you in the Chair at this, the final stage in the Conference's work on the chemical weapons convention. I also join with you in conveying our best wishes to our Italian colleague who, to the great loss of all of us here, has been whisked away to deal with even more important matters.

I have asked for the floor to draw the Conference's attention to a statement made by the Foreign Office spokesman yesterday in London in which he said that a global ban on chemical weapons had been a major arms control objective for the United Kingdom for many years. We had given up our own chemical weapons in the 1950s and we had proposed a draft convention as early as 1976. He went on to say that we warmly welcomed the draft convention which had been presented and which we, and the majority of delegations, had accepted as final. This was the culmination of all our efforts. The convention would make a substantial contribution to international peace and security. It would ban the possession, development and use of chemical weapons. It would require all States possessing chemical weapons to destroy them under international supervision. It would also establish the most intrusive verification regime yet agreed in any area of arms control; this would build confidence and deter cheating. The United Kingdom urged all States to accept the draft convention and to sign it as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your kind words to me and for informing us of this important statement by your Government. Is there any other delegation that wishes to speak at this stage? There is none.

I would now like to move on to other matters. As you know, each week the secretariat prepares a timetable of Conference meetings, but with almost all the subsidiary bodies having completed their work, we are planning only the plenary meeting which will be held on Thursday, 27 August, together with two meetings requested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, on Monday 24 and Wednesday 26 August at 3 p.m. Hence for the moment we did not think it necessary to have a weekly timetable circulated.

As provided for in the Conference's timetable of activities for this week, in half an hour's time we will hold informal consultations on the draft annual report to the General Assembly. We decided to allow the half-hour gap so that various parties could consult further among themselves on a few agenda items that are still causing difficulties. I hope that delegations will be punctual because I intend to start these informal consultations promptly. The meeting will be followed by open-ended consultations, chaired by Ambassador Zahran in his capacity as special coordinator for agenda item 9, on the subject of transparency in armaments.

Since we have now reached the end of the agenda, I will now adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 27 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.634
27 August 1992

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 August 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Michel Servais (Belgium)

GE.92-62837/4871B (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 634th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all I wish to welcome very warmly, on behalf of the Conference, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, who has already honoured us with his presence on several occasions. His statement to the Conference today bears witness to the important contribution Finland makes to our work, particularly as regards the negotiations on chemical weapons. I am convinced, Sir, that we will all follow your statement with very special interest.

On the list of speakers today I have the representatives of New Zealand, Finland, Peru, France, Mexico, Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, Norway, Cuba, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Bisley.

Mr. BISLEY (New Zealand): Mr. President, the CD session that is drawing to a close has been significant, and it gives me great pleasure at seeing you in the Chair at this time. You have the honour of overseeing the passage of the 1992 report of the Conference, a report to which will be annexed the draft chemical weapons convention (CWC). It is to that convention that I would like to devote my initial remarks.

New Zealand's commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction is a matter of record. We have supported negotiations to that end, by this Conference, since 1968. New Zealand does not, and has never, possessed chemical weapons. We have no intention of ever doing so.

At the Paris Conference in 1989 we withdrew our reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, thereby renouncing any use of chemical weapons as a method of warfare. We did so because we could not envisage any situation in which the use of these weapons could be warranted. We are pleased that others have taken a similar step. The 1925 Protocol fulfilled an important role in addressing the problems of chemical weapons. But it was not comprehensive and, as events of recent years have demonstrated clearly, it was not in itself sufficient to ensure that such weapons were not used again. We are confident that the new chemical weapons convention will be a far stronger and more effective instrument.

The draft which the chemical weapons Ad Hoc Committee, only last evening, agreeed to transmit to this plenary, and which must now go forward to the United Nations General Assembly, represents an enormous effort by a good number of dedicated and talented professionals. I am sure I will be only the first of a long list of speakers this morning to congratulate Ambassador von Wagner on his efforts during the final, intensive, phase of these negotiations. He and the team he gathered around him have done a job of which they can be justly proud, and for which all of us can be extremely grateful.

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

The conclusion of the chemical weapons convention has undoubtedly been helped by the new and improved international climate. But it is worth noting that the convention was largely negotiated during a period of threat and confrontation in world affairs. That was partly why the negotiations were spread over such a long time. Although they took so long, the fact that they continued throughout the difficult years of the cold war demonstrated the determination of the international community to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons.

Not all countries which have worked towards a chemical weapons convention, whether as members or non-members of the CD, agree with every clause or article of the draft. But that is the nature of international negotiations. We are all impelled by the desire to banish chemical weapons, but given the different concerns which inevitably exist among so many different States, a spirit of compromise and consensus is essential in the pursuit of our goal. That spirit has been very much in evidence in the past weeks.

The text now going forward is comprehensive. Development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons are dealt with in detail. S too is destruction. States undertake never to use chemical weapons under any circumstances. For many this is simply a reiteration of their commitment under the 1925 Protocol. But in its range, and particularly in the area of intrusive verification, the convention contributes to and consolidates new ideas about what the international community is coming to require as a part of effective arms control. The principles in this convention will become an accepted part of the world's norms in controlling proliferation.

New Zealand is not a member of this Conference, but we have sought to contribute to its work, both here in Geneva and closer to home in the Asia-Pacific region. We have joined partners in regional seminars over the course of the last two or three years to prepare for the chemical weapons convention and to urge unanimous support when it is open for signature. We have undertaken a national trial inspection and begun preparatory steps so as to be ready to fulfil the commitments required.

We are strongly of the view that this convention serves the interests of national - and international - security. Accordingly we in New Zealand join others endorsing the text and commending it to the international community. In fact, we would have been perfectly happy to do this in the Ad Hoc Committee last evening had it been possible for non-members of the Conference on Disarmament to take this step. We will in any case co-sponsor a resolution supporting the convention at the United Nations General Assembly. We are taking steps to ensure that New Zealand will be an original signatory when the convention is opened for signature in Paris in January next year.

The final negotiations and the next steps towards signature and ratification of the chemical weapons convention are taking place in an international atmosphere much less heavy with suspicion and distrust than in the earlier years of this Conference's work. Other significant steps forward

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

have been taken. Sweeping cuts to nuclear arsenals have been made by the two most heavily armed States. Even more drastic ones are planned. Nuclear testing is being reduced, and in two cases unilateral moratoriums are in place. Mutual confidence and cooperation are replacing mutual deterrence as the underpinning of global security.

The cold war has gone, but unfortunately its effects are still being felt. At its height it hampered in some parts of the world the normal processes of adjustment and shared development which would have enabled neighbouring ethnic groups to share in the world's increased prosperity since the Second World War. Instead we are confronted with areas of grave tension, of which the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is among the worst. Such tension cannot be dissipated overnight, and will require political will, first and foremost on the part of those most immediately involved. Faced with such tragedies the United Nations is seeking to establish a new and vital role for itself in peace-making as well as peace-keeping.

In such circumstances, and with its 20-year period of negotiation on a chemical weapons convention now over, this Conference must also consider its own role. For the last five years chemical weapons has been the Conference on Disarmament's major item. To be quite frank, it has been the only substantive item the Conference has considered in recent times. As we congratulate ourselves on the CWC outcome, we must also ask what we will devote our time and energy to in the future. This is not the occasion to consider in detail the answer to that question, just as we are at the stage of launching into the wider world the product of many years' labour. But we will need, at the Conference on Disarmament's next session, to explore fully the continuing responsibilities we have, and ways of giving substance and form to our deliberation on them. This is not just a long-term, or an academic, question. All of us have to justify to our Governments the resources allocated to various aspects of our Geneva operations. There are, as always, competing demands for staff time. Once the chemical weapons item is removed from its agenda, the Conference on Disarmament can no longer lay automatic claim to those resources to the extent it does so now.

There is no doubt that on most other issues, for example radiological weapons, NSAs, and outer space, interesting work is being done. Ad hoc committees are either involved in negotiations or, where political differences prevent this, conducting "preliminary work". But in no instance am I able to report to my Government that such substantive progress is being made as warrants New Zealand's full participation in those committees.

A new item on the agenda this year is that of transparency in armaments. New Zealand co-sponsored resolution 46/36 L, which accorded the Conference a particular role in this area, and we will of course maintain an active and positive interest in the consideration of the issue. But that resolution gave an expert group primary carriage of the subject; and indeed that subject does not in itself provide full-time work for a Conference with the CD's wide-ranging mandate.

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

It is of course true that included within the Conference on Disarmament's mandate is consideration of what many believe to be three fundamental nuclear issues. On two of them not even preliminary work has been agreed. And on the third, the item on a nuclear test ban, the Ad Hoc Committee has met for only 18 months in the past 9 years.

Last year New Zealand introduced in the United Nations General Assembly First Committee a resolution urging the re-establishment of the Committee in 1992 and requesting it to intensify its substantive work. That resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority, reflecting the international community's conviction in the value of a CTB as an arms control and non-proliferation measure. That the Comittee has not been re-established this year was therefore a great disappointment to New Zealand. We hope, indeed expect, that delegations will find the flexibility necessary to advance this issue early next year.

We hope for much from the Committee, not just because of our national position on the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of the CTB treaty, but also because abrogation of that responsibility would signal the Conference on Disarmament's inability to build on its chemical weapons success in a positive way. It would signal a loss of direction, and lead many to question the viability of the Conference on Disarmament and the continuing need for this kind of multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

For these reasons, New Zealand will, with others, be promoting at this year's United Nations General Assembly a resolution drawing attention again to the Conference on Disarmament's particular responsibilities in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. If these responsibilities are shirked, we fear for both the objective of a CTB, and for the Conference itself. A Conference which does not substantively address an issue as important to many as that of nuclear testing leaves itself open to critical scrutiny by Governments, and by the world community.

Others here know better than I that the Conference on Disarmament was established in a different era, with a membership reflecting a different world, a world facing different problems. The Conference has over the years gone through a series of incarnations, each designed to keep apace with this changing world.

Recent changes in the world are such that the time is ripe to consider again how the Conference on Disarmament should adapt to the future. 1993 will be telling in this regard. In facing up to that challenge the Conference on Disarmament must consider the issue of its membership so that membership is not another stumbling-block to the CD's relevance in the post-cold-war era. What is clear is that in today's climate all of us - members and non-members alike - will wish to scrutinize afresh the Conference on Disarmament's approach to its task. In this regard, the Conference's recent decision to permit non-members to observe Ambassador Kamal's informal consultations

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

on improved and effective functioning was a major step forward. We note that you, Mr. President, will be conducting follow-up consultations, inter-sessionally, on the specific questions of agenda and membership. Like other non-members, I look forward to discussing these subjects with you.

In this increasingly multipolar world, an ineffective multilateral disarmament negotiating body serves none of us. We owe it to ourselves, and to this Conference, to build on the success of the CWC negotiations. It would be ironic, and disappointing, if the Conference on Disarmament were, on the contrary, to be marginalized by that success. It lies in our hands to ensure that that does not happen.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and his kind words addressed to Ambassador von Wagner, Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons. I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Ambassador Karhilo, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, it gives me great satisfaction to be able to speak at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament today under your presidency. This session has been truly historic. The negotiations on the chemical weapons convention have been completed. A process that has lasted for more than 20 years comes to a successful conclusion in the very near future.

The conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, it seems to us, also brings to an end one era in the history of this Conference. In order to safeguard the CWC process, the profound changes in the world have been kept, to a large extent, outside of this chamber. Now it is the time to open the doors again and to see what consequences the changed world may bring to the CD.

These two topics will be the main subjects of my intervention today.

The history of the chemical weapons negotiations is characterized by a seemingly unending sequence of periods of high hopes and periods of almost total frustration. Many a negotiator has left Geneva with a conviction that the process will never end. And their conviction was well founded, but fortunately, as we see now, the reality has taken another course. That course has not, however, been easy to adopt. In order to reach the stage where we are today all participants have had to make hard decisions concerning concessions on important issues of principle and to set the priorities and preferences in their proper order. It has been a difficult task for all of us, not least because of the accelerated pace at which the negotiations have advanced during this year. We all have been assisted in this process, willingly or through friendly persuasion by our Chairman, Ambassador von Wagner. With his Chairman's texts he has given us guidance on what is achievable and what is not. Without his determination and that of his whole team, the visions of a never-ending process might well have become true.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

It is with regret that we have to note, however, that it seems that not all of the participants in the negotiations can join in full support of the convention text. At least not at this point in time. That is a serious shortcoming in our efforts. But it is not the end of the world. It is not even unprecedented in the history of the Conference. On the contrary, it has been more of a rule than an exception that there is no consensus on the final outcome of the negotiations. That has not hindered in the past consensus on the transmittal of the outcome to the General Assembly and the opening of the agreements for signature. We strongly hope that this pattern will prevail.

As is known already, the final text of the convention is in various parts considerably different from what Finland had thought should be achieved in such a treaty. As is true with many other delegations, the main disappointments in the text from our point of view are to be found in the parts dealing with verification. There our main concerns are centred on the overall effectivness and objectivity of the regime. The verification system for us has always been the final guarantee that the increased security brought about by the convention is real. We hope that the CWC verification regime proves to be in practice both the deterrent against violations and the evidence-gathering mechanism that it is meant to be.

The principal focus of Finland's contribution to these negotiations has been technical and scientific. Some of this input is visible in the text of the convention. Some of it will fall under the purview of the preparatory commission's work. Our main objective in this respect has been to conserve scientific precision and objectivity whenever science is applied in the implementation of the convention. That is to say that the science that is being applied should rather be called analytical chemistry than political chemistry.

At the same time we of course recognize that analytical chemistry is not the only tool for the verification of the chemical weapons convention. It is one of many and its usefulness depends on many factors. At best it can, however, be the tool to produce unambiguous evidence on violations.

No treaty is perfect. Even with its deficiencies the chemical weapons convention is a remarkable achievement. It means substantial progress in international security. It includes major innovative provisions. It constitutes a major step in the endeavour to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. The time to conclude the convention was now. Consequences of a failure to do so would have risked the convention altogether. Therefore, Finland associates itself with the statement made by France, joined by several other delegations yesterday at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is reflected in the Committee's report.

During the last year or so it has been heartening to notice that the demand for full sets of the Finnish Blue Books has increased. A clear sign that the approaching end to the negotiations has not gone unnoticed by the laboratories that may seek to have a function related to the convention. As to our own laboratory, I can repeat the pledge made a couple of years ago that its competence will be at the full service of the organization.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

The setting up of the necessary laboratory network for the organization is one of the tasks that the preparatory commission should embark upon at an early stage of its work. The accreditation process will take time. But it ensures that highly skilled personnel in well-equipped laboratories follow strict quality assurance procedures as required for such a network. And accreditation has to be completed before the entry into force of the convention.

Another practical preparatory operation that cannot be delayed is the training of inspectors. Several countries are already offering or plannig to offer training programmes that are of relevance to the CWC. However, at the moment there are no guidelines for these countries as to the contents of the training programmes. It is in the interest of both the organizers of these programmes and the participants that the programmes conform to the needs of the organization to the maximum extent possible, that they do not overlap unnecessarily, and that they form logical parts of the overall training scheme.

From our own experience with training we can conclude that the skills needed during an inspection are so varied and the required depth of specialization so great that in practice it will be impossible that all of them could be accumulated by one person, the inspector. Rather, the organization will need trained specialists in several aspects of inspections. Consequently the inspection team will have to be composed of the specialists needed to fulfil a certain inspection mandate. This fact will naturally have to be reflected in the training programmes. There is no need to try to include everything in one single programme, but rather one can concentrate the programmes on a certain skill or skills and increase the depth of training in those. The programmes should be focused. And they should be focused on relevant matters in a relevant manner.

At the same time coordination between the programme organizers is very important. In order to optimize the utilization of scarce resources duplication of efforts should be avoided. And it is as important that one should try to make sure that all the relevant aspects will be covered by training programmes.

A lot of work has to be done in this field. We have been glad to notice that a growing number of delegations have started to discuss these issues and that voluntary coordination and background work among the organizers is being developed.

The conclusion of the chemical weapons convention immediately brings into mind thoughts on the future work of the Conference on Disarmament. Important statements have already been made in this room about the prospects for the future. All of the speakers have in one form or another also referred to the possibility of an end to the CD altogether. That clearly shows that the issue is serious.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

The Conference on Disarmament is, by definition, a negotiating body. But do we actually know what that definition means or should mean in today's world? Indeed, what should the products of this kind of a body look like in order to respond to the actual security needs of countries? The perceptions of the role of the CD and its products tend to date from the cold war era and the then prevailing threats. A possibility of a war between the two military alliances and its different devastating aspects was a significant security concern for practically all countries. Therefore, the agendas of global disarmament forums focused on topics that would help in decreasing those threats.

Today the world is radically different from only a few years ago. So are the immediate threat perceptions of many countries. For some the situation is much more secure than before. For some it is more insecure. A decrease in global tension has in many places given room for increased local tensions which for the countries in question may have had adverse effects on their security. Some old security issues have been given new dimensions and importance in the new world. All non-proliferation issues belong to that category. Then there are totally new security issues which have emerged into the limelight during the last years - for example the safe handling, storage and disposal of weapons systems. And all these new issues affecting the security of individual countries, regions and the world as a whole are in obvious ways interconnected.

As in the past during the cold war era the countries most directly involved and affected may well achieve some good results which have global dimensions. However, the nature of many of the new threats and security concerns call for wider participation by the international community in their solution. But even so, should those solutions take the form of global conventions of the CWC type for example? Or should we rather think in terms of more limited documents and agreements? Are the security needs of countries better served by reactions to topical issues with restricted dimensions than by near-eternal negotiations on very complex conventions or on topics where no progress is achieved?

We need to think that by lowering the target levels we may gain in meaningful achievements. And by relieving resources from stagnated processes to new spheres of activity a greater number of concerns are given the chance to be addressed adequately.

In reviewing the agenda and the programme of work of the Conference the practical implication of these ideas is twofold. First, it should be assessed whether it is useful to continue with the general target of each item or more useful to concentrate on a restricted, concrete subitem or another type of product than hitherto conceived as the aim of the process. Secondly one should assess whether the time and effort spent on each item would be better utilized for a new topic altogether given the realistic prospects for achievement.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Apart from the agenda there is also another feature of the CD which no longer reflects the realities of the world. That is the composition of the Conference. Throughout its history the composition of this Conference has carefully followed the political balances of the world. Today the political balance that determined the composition of the CD in 1979 is no longer valid. What this could and should mean to the CD was very aptly pointed out by Ambassador Hyltenius on 23 July.

The changes that have taken place in the world have also changed the essence of many of the issues. The issues are also increasingly becoming multifaceted. They do not follow the historically customary balancing lines. And they should not be artificially forced to do so. An attempt to maintain an obsolete balance or to create a new equilibrium will do just that.

The exact number of members or participants does not seem to be a real issue. The negotiating history of the chemical weapons convention shows that an annually increasing number of participants did not make the process more difficult. The benefits of having had a large number of observers participating in the process will become apparent between now and the entry into force of the convention. When the product of a treaty negotiation is presented to the international community for signature, it is beneficial to have a large part of that community already as supporters of the outcome. They are the ones that make any treaty a universal one, not the limited number of negotiators.

In conclusion it seems therefore very important to give all those countries that are able and willing to contribute to the negotiations an equal chance of doing so on the subjects that are most important to them. The idea of opening the Conference on Disarmament to all States which apply for membership seems to us well worth pursuing. We tend to agree that the number of participants would in that case increase, but in a rather modest fashion. One way of keeping the total number of members relatively low is to maintain, even in that formula, the possibility of following the negotiations as an observer. It would then be up to the States themselves to decide how they would like to participate in the Conference.

The exchange of views on the future agenda and composition of the Conference will begin very soon in the form of informal consultations of the President of the Conference. We have been very pleased to note that it is your intention, Mr. President, to seek during this phase also the opinions and views of observer countries. This procedure we understand as a recognition of the fact that the future of this Conference depends not only on the members but on a larger group of active and interested countries.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Karhilo of Finland for his statement, and for his words of encouragement and the extremely interesting suggestions he made. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you the great satisfaction my delegation feels at seeing you presiding over the Conference at this time of the year when very important work is coming to a conclusion. You may be sure of our support. We have every confidence in your drive and patience, which are a guarantee of success. I should also like to express my best wishes to the Ambassador of Italy, Andrea Negrotto Cambiaso, in the discharge of his new and important responsibilities which await him in Rome; likewise to Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, who has also been summoned by his Government for important duties in Buenos Aires. Similarly my delegation warmly welcomes the Ambassadors of Sri Lanka and Poland, whom we wish a happy stay in this city together with their respective families.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the gifted leadership of the Ambassador of Germany, Adolf von Wagner, has just made a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security with the conclusion of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. This achievement, which will prove to be a landmark in the history of disarmament, was made possible by the convergence of the political will of the States represented here and the undeniable skill displayed by Ambassador von Wagner and his delegation when they chose the path which made it possible gradually to strike a consensus on those substantive issues which were still pending and were difficult.

The convention on chemical weapons, the first of its kind in its scope and complexity, negotiations on which have finally been concluded, constitutes an extensive exercise in cooperation and solidarity among the States parties for the purpose of achieving the elimination of these horrific weapons of mass destruction once and for all. In this regard, and with this conviction, we know that this convention builds upon the precedent set by the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. And bright prospects are undoubtedly opening up for the realization of nuclear disarmament, including the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, in the not too distant future.

Although Peru's decision to be an original signatory of the convention is well known, I should like to take this opportunity to place on record my country's full support for the draft convention contained in document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.2. It is no secret to anyone that the draft convention contains the minimum that is acceptable to the vast majority of delegations. But it is this very common denominator which made it possible for the Ad Hoc Committee to accomplish in full the task entrusted to it.

Peru's expectations were of course greater, as no doubt were those of many other member States of this Conference. Nevertheless, the draft convention embodies the concessions that the member States had to make to one another, all of them guided by the sole objective of eliminating chemical weapons from the face of the Earth.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

My delegation could make many observations on the draft convention at the end of this negotiating process. For the moment I will restrict myself to making only a few such observations, relating to some aspects of its content. In the first place, it might perhaps have been desirable to update the preamble, which dates for the most part from 1985, in order to bring it into line with the scope of the general obligations set out in article I.

Second, we consider that the definitions and criteria in article II are consistent with the prohibitions appearing in article I. Even though the definition of chemical weapons displays a degree of latitude, we proceed from the assumption that good faith on the part of the States parties will prevent possible combinations of circumstances from being readily confused with an alleged intention to flout obligations entered into under the convention. At all events, in the interests of safety it would appear preferable to have a degree of flexibility in interpretation rather than a narrow definition which might be overtaken in the future by ceaseless technological development, particularly in the field of non-lethal chemicals.

Third, it is true that if law enforcement is not referred to as "domestic", as in article II, paragraph 9 (d), this might give rise to far-fetched interpretations going beyond what the negotiators intended. Consequently, my delegation considers it appropriate to point out that as far as Peru is concerned law enforcement is within the competence of each geographical State, except for activities that might be carried out by United Nations peace-keeping forces.

Fourth, in Peru's view the good faith of the States possessing chemical weapons will be judged by the way in which they implement their general plans for the destruction of their stockpiles; it would be desirable for the destruction of chemical weapons to be effected more rapidly, except in the cases specified in part IV (A), paragraph 21 of the annex on implementation and verification. We continue to regard it as regrettable that States will be under the obligation to destroy only 45 per cent of their chemical weapons by the end of the seventh year of the destruction process, especially since this appears to prejudge the extension of the destruction period for five more years, as referred to in part IV (A), paragraph 24. This is why my delegation attaches particular importance to the principle set forth in article IV, paragraph 16, regarding the obligation of a State possessing chemical weapons also to meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of such weapons, unless the executive council decides otherwise.

Fifth, the provisions of article VI, in the view of experts, restrict the scope of verification of world chemical industry. Of course, it was in no one's mind to cover the whole of this dynamic productive industrial sector, since verification would have been unmanageable and exorbitantly costly. Yet it was thought to be possible to cover more than 30 per cent of "capable facilities". In the end, the objectives of the convention proved to be more modest, either because thresholds were raised or because it focused solely on "PSF facilities".

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Sixth, the agreed composition of the executive council was not the happiest solution for Latin America and the Caribbean. We accepted the agreement as the best way of stimulating greater involvement, particularly by Africa, among the original signatories. Yet at the same time we attach particular importance to article VIII, paragraph 25, under which, as soon as the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities has been completed, the conference may, at the request of a majority of the members of the executive council, review the composition of the council, taking into account developments related to the principles specified in paragraph 23.

Seventh, Peru continues to believe that the amendment procedure set out in article XV suffers from the shortcoming that it makes the new convention very rigid, to the point that it might become fossilized through the actions of a single State party which either opposed an amendment or merely decided dramatically to refrain from ratifying it, even after having voted in favour.

Eighth, my delegation welcomes the important statement made by the Ambassador of Australia, Paul O'Sullivan, on behalf of the Australia Group, whereby the member countries of the Group made a commitment to seek to eliminate restrictions on transfers among the States parties. For the same reasons, my delegation welcomes the inclusion in parts VII and VIII of the verification annex of important provisions designed to monitor transfers to States which are not parties to the convention.

Lastly, it is to be hoped that the ban on making reservations to the various articles of the convention will not lead to the unhealthy practice of interpretative declarations. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such declarations must be regarded to all intents and purposes as reservations, and they therefore fall under the ban.

We know that the preparatory commission has an arduous task ahead of it and that the way it addresses and resolves the questions within its competence will determine whether there is a smooth transition to the future international organization. It is therefore advisable to give due advance consideration to its structure and agenda in order to smooth the path to full operation at the beginning of next year.

It is well known that the convention which we have just concluded will be the first significant agreement produced by this sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in 16 years. The problem starting in 1993 therefore will be to what extent it is advisable to restructure the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in order to encourage greater productivity. Are we to set aside the 1978 "Decalogue" in order to modernize the agenda? Or should we seek more pragmatic formulas to make innovations without falling into the temptation of modifying or complicating the topics in the Decalogue? My delegation thinks that the second option appears the most advisable in the present circumstances, since the 1978 Decalogue contains all the issues related to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

ultimate goal pursued by the international community. Consequently, while there must be innovation, this should come about in the annual agenda of the Conference in the light of changing circumstances and a sense of timing, so that it will be perfectly possible to pick out selectively certain specific topics on which the Conference is in a position to negotiate or prepare the ground for the immediate commencement of negotiations. Such a selective and topical approach would enable the Conference on Disarmament to reaffirm its negotiating character, banishing once and for all the tendency to embark on discussions which really belong in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

We are aware of the work which you, Sir, will have to undertake in the inter-sessional period in connection with this very important subject on the agenda, and I would now like to inform you that my delegation would prefer a shorter, selective agenda focusing on the urgent issues, on the basis of the 1978 Decalogue, in which it would be really possible to commence negotiations with a view to the conclusion of agreements in the future. Addressing topics as complex as nuclear disarmament in a sweeping and global way could simply mean not wishing to do anything about them. In this context, my delegation ventures to propose for 1993 just five topics for the agenda, of which two at least should be the subject of intense negotiations in order to keep up the momentum in this Conference which was achieved with the finalization of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons. These specific topics would be as follows.

First of all, a total ban on nuclear tests. On this subject, no member State of this negotiation body should lose sight of the fact that the NPT sets a deadline which will expire without fail in 1995. And that to ensure the indefinite extension of this mulilateral instrument, negotiations must be begun for the suspension of nuclear testing. Therefore in 1993, in the view of my delegation, the Ad Hoc Committee on this question should be re-established with a negotiating mandate and with the additional task of modifying the mandate of the Group of Scientific Experts to take account of the urgent need to devise a verification system which can be applied to this type of prohibition. In saying this, my delegation thanks the Austrian Government for the continued cooperation which it has extended to the Peruvian expert, and believes that only a concerted international effort in this field will enable the Group of Scientific Experts to complete its works rapidly.

Another topic for the agenda would be a protocol on renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. This is another of the specific topics which my delegation is proposing and which in part falls under present items 2, 3 and 6 of the Conference's agenda. The elimination or withdrawal of tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons from the main theatres in which the cold war was conducted and their use was contemplated has logically resulted in the raising of the thresholds for nuclear reprisals, with the virtual elimination of the "first strike". For that reason we believe that in this Conference, it is now possible, given the presence here of the five nuclear Powers, to commence negotiations on a protocol which will prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. As far as the scope of obligations is concerned, this protocol could perhaps draw

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

on the Geneva Protocol of 1925, without of course taking the analogy too far. This should in no way constitute a bar to the immediate consideration of other initiatives to encourage the process of nuclear disarmament.

Another interesting matter in our view would be an agreement on confidence-building measures in outer space. This is another of those fields in which it might very well be relatively easy for the Conference to achieve an agreement in the short term. Instead of getting lost in technical discussions which do nothing to deter the militarization of outer space, we believe that the time has come to address a practical item on which valuable initiatives already exist which need to be reconsidered.

We also consider that it would be interesting in the agenda to examine the possibility of a protocol between the five nuclear Powers whereby they would renounce radiological weapons. My delegation believes that this subject was made unnecessarily complicated when new proposals were added to the original one, regardless of whether the approach was legitimate. Here we are talking about weapons which have never existed, but which might one day be produced. Therefore an agreement on this matter should be a priority matter for the five nuclear Powers, which could take into account certain concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon countries. With this approach we are sure that the negotiations would be simplified and greatly facilitated, without prejudice to consideration of this issue within the context of the Conference on Disarmament. At the end of this process, the other member States of the Conference would be called on to consider the protocol and endorse it, as appropriate, with a view to universal membership. Meanwhile it is understood that the important question of a ban on attacks against nuclear facilities should be the subject of a diplomatic conference within the framework of international humanitarian law, since in this particular case we would not really be talking about disarmament proper and it might therefore fall outside the field of competence of the CD.

Lastly, another important matter in our view is transparency in armaments. On this subject discussion is possible as the best means of defining areas in which the CD might make a practical contribution to the efforts of the United Nations General Assembly. We have in mind in particular the need to consider monitoring of the production of armaments and the transfer of dual-use technologies, for the very purpose of avoiding uncontrolled proliferation of such technologies to the detriment of regional security in particular. For Peru a curbing of production would be the logical counterpart of the monitoring of transfers, since it is production that lies at the root of the arms race.

An agenda of this kind in no way presupposes avoiding important subjects such as non-proliferation in all its aspects, inter alia. However, it seems to us that given its scale and implications, this subject is more properly addressed in the Disarmament Commission than in a negotiating forum.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

We nurture the hope that the consultations you will be holding in the inter-sessional period, Mr. President, on the agenda and expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, will be crowned with success. Nevertheless, should this not prove possible, my delegation would remind you that for next year we might give thought to the designation of two special coordinators who, under the direction of the current President of the Conference, would be in a position to devote themselves exclusively to the search for solutions to these important questions. In the meantime, the temporary lack of agreement at the commencement of the 1993 session should not be a sufficient reason for maintaining the status quo, unless imagination and goodwill have once again vanished from this historic Council chamber.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for his words of encouragement in the task entrusted to me. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to say how delighted my delegation is to see presiding over the Conference the representative of a friendly country, one which has always been bound to France by close ties in all areas. Accept my warmest wishes for success in your important task, which you have taken up at a crucial point in the history of the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me also to repeat the tribute I paid to your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria. I would also like to welcome our new colleagues from Poland and Sri Lanka. Lastly, I would like to welcome the presence among us of the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Karhilo, and to thank him especially for the support he kindly gave to the statement I made yesterday in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

I have asked for the floor in order to inform the Conference that on 24 August, in keeping with the decision announced by the President of the Republic during the summit-level meeting of the Security Council on 31 January last, France formally deposited with the Government of Mexico its instruments of ratification of Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This initiative reflects the importance which France attaches to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its resolve to make a contribution to the full implementation of that instrument. In this spirit we have taken note with satisfaction of the measures adopted by certain Latin American States in order to speed up the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. With reference to the process to amend the Treaty launched by those countries, it is of course up to all the sovereign States in that region to take a decision. We very much hope that consensus will emerge, thus making it possible for all the States in the region to accede to the Treaty once and for all. Together with other initiatives taken by the States of Latin America, such as the Mendoza and Cartagena declarations, the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco will be a new positive factor in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the strengthening of confidence and security in the region.

(Mr. Errera, France)

In ratifying Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, France wishes to recall once again that the non-proliferation of arms of mass destruction remains an imperative for the international community, as was stressed in the declaration adopted at the summmit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January. It is in that spirit that on 3 August, France deposited its instruments of accession to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is in that spirit that at an earlier stage it signed Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which contains negative security assurances for the benefit of States parties, precisely because those States had made legally binding commitments in the field of non-proliferation. It is also in that spirit that it has undertaken to become an original signatory of the chemical weapons convention. And it is in that spirit that France will continue to contribute to the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in which all States, North and South, have a major interest, and which therefore requires joint action on our part. In this common endeavour, the Conference on Disarmament has an important role to play. Non-proliferation issues, we believe, already form part of the tasks of the Conference, in one way or another, and are among its priorities. It is up to us to confirm this determination, by practical actions, in our future work. It is clear that the links between disarmament and non-proliferation are becoming closer every day. Hence only we can decide that it should be in a multilateral context that progress will be accomplished, a broad consensus will appear and rules will be negotiated. We hope in this regard that the useful informal consultations undertaken at the initiative of our colleague from Mexico, Ambassador Marin Bosch, will produce the necessary decisions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Errera for his kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, please accept the appreciation of the Mexican delegation for the way in which you have been presiding over the work of this Conference. We asked for the floor in order to refer to the event which has just been announced by the distinguished representative of France - the deposit of the instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This completes one more stage, the second, in the long process of consolidating the status of military de-nuclearization in the region. The first of these stages ended in 1979 with the accession of the then Soviet Union to Additional Protocol II, in which the nuclear-weapon States undertake, inter alia, not to use or threaten to use such weapons against contracting parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It was in the year 1979 that the French Government signed Additional Protocol I, which is open for accession by States outside the region having de jure or de facto international responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty. In that instrument those States undertake to apply the statute of de-nuclearization in such territories in respect of warlike purposes. The States in question are the United States,

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well as France. The Government of Mexico wishes to place on record its keen appreciation for the action just taken by the Government of France, a country which has so many historical, cultural and economic ties with our region.

As you will remember resolution 2286 (XXII) of 1967, the General Assembly stated that the Treaty of Tlatelolco "constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security". The Treaty itself states that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself "but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage". It is now for the States of the region to take the necessary steps to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in their territories. Of the 33 independent States of the region of Latin America and the Caribbean, 24 are already parties to the Treaty; 2 have signed and ratified it, but without the waiver provided for in article 28; with the signature of the Treaty by Saint Lucia on 25 August this year, 4 States have signed but not yet ratified it, and 3 have not yet signed.

In this connection, the delegation of Mexico, as the representative of the depositary Government of the Treaty, wishes to inform this Conference that yesterday in Mexico City the General Conference of OPANAL, the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, began a special meeting to consider a series of amendments to the Treaty which the Mexican Government tabled for consideration by the other contracting parties. The amendments, which will be distributed in a working paper of this Conference, relate to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of the Treaty and are the result of negotiations with the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, which have undertaken to accept the full and immediate application of the Treaty once the amendments have been favourably considered at the special meeting of the General Conference. The Mexican Government, it should be said, is convinced that the amendments do not modify the spirit of the Treaty in essential respects, but do make it possible to progress towards the common objective of bringing the Treaty fully into force. This, together with the announcement repeated recently by the Cuban Government that it is prepared to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco if other countries do likewise, is a clear display of the resolve of all countries of Latin America and Caribbean to ensure the consolidation of the regime of military de-nuclearization in the region. This year of 1992, the silver anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has witnessed various events which mark significant steps towards such a consolidation. The States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco entertain the hope that the evidence of goodwill by other countries in the region will speedily result in practical actions such as that which we have welcomed today.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): At the outset, Mr. President, I would like to convey to you the congratulations of the delegation of Egypt on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at a stage when the CD session

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

is close to its end, with the double responsibility of preparing and adopting its report. I would like to assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I seize this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, for the skilful and effective manner in which he steered the work of the CD during the tenure of his presidency. While I extend a warm welcome to our midst to Ambassador Goonetilleke of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Ludvik Dembinski of Poland, who have recently joined us in the CD, I regret the departure of three of our colleagues and express my best wishes to Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso of Italy and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India as all of them terminate successfully their mission and for their invaluable contributions to the deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament. I wish them all success in the assumption of their new responsibilities.

The Egyptian delegation has worked diligently among other delegations in order to elaborate a water-tight convention to ban chemical weapons. On this occasion I seize the opportunity to pay tribute to the contribution made by Ambassador von Wagner and the German delegation as the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons terminated its work late yesterday, 26 August, by adopting its report which will be transmitted later to the Conference. Egypt has always supported all measures designed to contribute to the promotion of international and regional stability and has always committed itself to engage in constructive negotiations to fulfil this objective. It is with this understanding that the delegation of Egypt, together with other delegations, have presented amendments to the draft convention in a constructive spirit with a view to enhancing the universality of the convention. Egypt has always attached great importance to including in the draft convention issues that it regards as vital to its national security and interests. We genuinely hoped that such concerns would have been included in the text of the draft convention. Allow me at this juncture to mention briefly some of these concerns that are momentous to us and that were made available in more detail in working paper CD/CW/WP.434 and reflected in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee (CD/CW/WP.436). First, article II, particularly the problem of the wide-spectrum definition of chemical weapons. Second, article VIII, and in particular the imbalance in the regional representation in the executive council, especially the inequitable share reserved for the African grouping in the council. Third, article IX, and in particular the powers of the executive council as regards challenge inspection, and the Egyptian proposal to address possible abuse of challenge inspection. Fourth, article XI, as we were unable to get a clear-cut commitment in the convention that its implementation will not hamper the economic and technological development of the States parties.

Egypt participated actively in the negotiations on the CWC, and we hoped that it would achieve universal adherence by reflecting the legitimate sovereign rights and vital interests of all States in view of our need to live in peace and security and cooperate with other members of the international

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

community. We appreciate the goodwill of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador von Wagner, who provided clarification of some of the provisions of the draft convention. However, regarding his explanation on the definition of chemical weapons in article II, we find that it falls short of total clarity and complete satisfaction. On the other hand, my delegation is putting a question regarding the authoritative legal status of the Chairman's explanation in so far as the ambiguity of certain provisions and the clarity of others versus the text of the draft convention. However, the explanatory statement of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee is indicative of the complexity of the draft convention. In addition, the draft convention does not meet the requirement of providing full-scope security assurances to face the case of an aggression using chemical weapons against a State party to this convention; a legitimate requirement which should be studied in view of addressing it.

In spite of the said misgivings and concerns, my delegation will not stand in the way of a decision by the Conference on Disarmament to transmit the draft CWC to the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly for consideration.

We believe that a good and balanced convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is a step forward which enhances the implementation of President Mubarak's initiative of April 1990 that called for declaring the Middle East a region free of weapons of mass destruction under effective international control. The said initiative is intended to involve all weapons of mass destruction, namely, nuclear, chemical and biological. The draft chemical weapons convention, together with the non-proliferation Treaty and the biological weapons Convention, are considered to be the three pillars on which the said zone should be established. Hence, from the regional perspective, we cannot dissociate the CWC from the NPT and BWC. We have a strong conviction that all States in the region should bear equal, reciprocal and balanced obligations deriving from the above-mentioned three international instruments governing weapons of mass destruction all together. In this regard, I would like to recall the letter addressed by His Excellency Amre Moussa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 19 July 1991 (A/46/329) in which he enumerated basic elements for the promotion of international and regional stability and security. The said elements include, inter alia: first, a quantitative and qualitative balance between the military capabilities of all States in the region; and second, the accordance of priority to ridding the region of weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

In addition, on 5 July 1991, Egypt announced a series of additional ideas and proposals on the issue of regional disarmament in the Middle East. First, the major arms-producing States, and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as Israel, Iran and the Arab States, should deposit undertakings with the Security Council in which they clearly and unconditionally endorse the declaration of the Middle East as a region free of weapons of mass destruction and commit themselves not to take any steps or

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

measures which would run counter to or impede the attainment of that objective. Second, the arms-producing States and the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should step up their efforts to ensure that all Middle East nations which have not yet done so adhere to the NPT. Third, States of the Middle East which have not yet done so should declare their commitment not to use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear material suitable for military use and to dispose of any existing stocks of such material, and to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards regime. Fourth, those States of the region which have not yet done so should declare their commitment to adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, as well as the Convention concerning the prohibition of biological weapons of 1972, no later than the conclusion of the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons being conducted under CD auspices. Fifth, the Middle East States should declare their commitment to address measures relating to all forms of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. Sixth, the States of the region should approve the assignment to an organ of the United Nations or any other international organization of a role to be agreed upon in the verification of the agreements to be concluded in this regard.

The above-mentioned considerations also fall within the scope of the peace process currently under way since the Madrid Conference started aiming at restoring a comprehensive, just and final peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction through the adherence of all States in the Middle East to the NPT, CWC and BWC constitutes a positive contribution and one of the confidence-building measures which accelerate the peace process.

I would like to take the opportunity of having the floor today to speak in my capacity as Special Coordinator for item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", and item 9, "Transparency in armaments". I felt it would be appropriate to say a final word this year on these two items which the Conference entrusted me to steward, in the light of the paragraphs relating to these items to be inserted in the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament.

As this was my first time to fulfil the functions of a special coordinator in the Conference, allow me to take this opportunity to thank all delegations for their cooperation and goodwill which enabled me to complete my tasks in good time.

With respect to the "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" (item 8), the situation is clear. The Conference, working on the basis of the consensus rule, is bound to wait until there is general agreement when the time is ripe to continue negotiations on the programme. In this respect, the report reflects faithfully the situation in the Conference this year.

I should like here to express my appreciation for the close cooperation I received from the item coordinators for CPD, namely Señora Bauta Solés of Cuba, Mr. Dubuisson of Belgium and Mr. Gaspar of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, as well as Mr. Gu of China.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Regarding transparency in armaments (item 9), the task went beyond the normal role of a special coordinator to include the chairing by me of the consultations in informal meetings of the Conference on the draft substantive paragraphs. It was particularly satisfying to me to achieve the mandate entrusted to me in this regard, knowing the importance the General Assembly will attach to the work of the Conference in 1992, as reflected in its annual report. I was particularly impressed by the amount of effort that delegations made on the item of transparency in armaments. With little time at our disposal, and the conflicting demands of the chemical weapons negotiations, the results achieved on this item went frankly beyond my expectations. The inscription of the new item on the agenda was not only a given event; the negotiations proved delicate, but, I believe, of definite value, as all points of view were clearly sounded. The five informal meetings held heard 23 speakers from members and non-members alike. The paragraphs devoted to this item which will be included in the annual report of the Conference genuinely reflect the discussions held in the Conference. There is a listing of the many topics raised and the varied proposals put forward, many of which were very specific. No attempt was made to reach agreement on any of them. They will give some indication for further consideration in the 1993 session.

In my personal view as Special Coordinator, the work this year was "a good start". Much remains to be done in order to focus in and define those areas in which the Conference can make a genuine contribution to increasing openness and transparency among States in the field of arms transfers. The Conference has taken its first step in 1992. Next year will surely prove to be an interesting year in the Conference's work on this subject. By next year we shall have available the report of the panel of governmental technical experts, which will be presented to the forty-seventh General Assembly. I recall also that the secretariat will be compiling a document containing measures of transparency that have been adopted at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. I remind delegations to bring to the attention of the secretariat any measures that they have identified which they would want to appear in that document. Here again I would like to express my appreciation and thanks for the close cooperation I received from the coordinators of the TIA item, namely Mr. Adekeye of Nigeria, Mr. Anastassov of Bulgaria, Mr. Finaud of France and Mr. Liu of China.

I should also like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berastegui, and his competent staff, especially Mr. Michael Cassandra and Ms. Johnston, for their efforts to supply us expeditiously with documents, papers and other material we worked on. To the interpreters and translators and all conference staff also goes my gratitude for the smooth running of the discussions within the informal meetings of the Conference I have chaired.

With these few words I shall end this part of my statement as Special Coordinator for items 8 and 9.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

In conclusion, as my colleague, Counsellor Dr. Mahmoud Karem, is going to leave us to go back to Cairo in a few days to assume the responsibility of heading the Division of Disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I would like to pay a special tribute to him and to express my appreciation for his contributions in the deliberations on various items in the Conference on Disarmament. On the other hand, I was compensated by an able colleague, Counsellor Mrs. Fatma Hussein, who joined the Egyptian Mission recently and who will work with me in disarmament affairs. I am sure that we will benefit from her experience in our future work. She was in charge of disarmament questions in the Foreign Ministry and, before that, in Vienna she had gained experience from her work with IAEA.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for the statements you have just made and the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I would also like to thank Dr. Karem, who has served the Conference on two occasions now with great efficiency. We are sure that he will stay in contact with us because the duties he is to take up in Cairo relate to disarmament and he will certainly maintain close links with us. We also welcome your colleague who is to replace him.

Since Ambassador Zahran spoke during his statement in his capacity as Special Coordinator for agenda item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", and item 9, "Transparency in armaments", I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate him on the fine work accomplished on those two agenda items. As he emphasized himself, at the request of the President Ambassador Zahran went beyond the traditional functions of a special coordinator on item 9 and oversaw the preparation of the draft substantive paragraphs. I am convinced that these paragraphs represent an invaluable contribution to the content of the annual report and that they will be followed with great attention by the General Assembly. Once again, Mr. Ambassador, wholehearted thanks for what you have done.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): I have the honour to introduce my report on the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, circulated as document CD/WP.435.

Despite the relatively short time that the Conference was able to devote to this exercise during the current session, agreement has emerged on important areas, such as the need for brevity in report writing, the possible reduction of plenary meetings, the organization of work of ad hoc committees, the tenure of the presidency, the possibility of avoiding unnecessary duplication in documentation, and the identification of possible future courses of action on the agenda and membership of the Conference. In a happy departure from past practice, observer delegations were able to attend the informal open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning this year for the first time.

The exercise has thus proved its utility once again in the ongoing and constant search of the Conference for its self-improvement.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you very much, Ambassador Kamal, for introducing your report, which, as you reminded us, has been distributed as CD/WP.435. Thank you also for your kind words, and I would like to congratulate you on the work accomplished with consistent efficiency over the three years in which you have been entrusted with this topic. I cannot say that I am the greatest beneficiary of this exercise because I have been entrusted with a most delicate mission, but you are not entirely responsible for that. We will come back to this report at the end of the meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): I would like to tell you, Mr. President, how pleased the delegation of Morocco is to congratulate you on taking over the Chair at a time when the Conference on Disarmament is about to close a particularly active session. I am sure that thanks to your outstanding qualities, you will guide our final efforts to a happy outcome. To your predecessors Ambassadors Moritán and O'Sullivan I would like to express our gratitude for their valuable contributions. It is also with genuine pleasure that I welcome the Under-Secretary of State, Ambassador Karhilo, whose devotion to his work at the Paris Conference in January 1990 left us with a memory of a man of greatly appreciated professional and human abilities.

For many years the procrastination in the Conference gave rise to doubts as to its effectiveness and raised questions concerning its future. The international climate prevailing at that time could account for its marginalization and the prolonged lack of progress in its work. Today, thanks to intensive efforts in the negotiations on chemical weapons, we are ready to restore the credibility of the Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. The mandate entrusted to it is about to be crowned by the approval of the draft convention. This result, which we welcome, creates new conditions that give grounds for the hopes that we are entitled to place in the Conference's ability to take the further steps specified in the terms of reference with which it had been entrusted.

Faithful to a tradition firmly rooted in its history and in its geo-political position at the point of confluence of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and also faithful to its commitments, the Kingdom of Morocco has always displayed its support for disarmament by acceding to the relevant conventions. This commitment was reaffirmed by His Majesty King Hassan II at the summit meeting of the Security Council held on 31 January last. I quote:

> "The progress achieved in the nuclear sphere should not prevent us from redoubling our joint efforts to ensure the success of the Geneva negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction in order to rid ourselves of a devastating weapon that constitutes a negation of civilization and its noble human values. We believe that disarmament will have no true significance unless it engenders in the countries of the North the dynamics of cooperation with the countries of the South to help the latter to free themselves from underdevelopment.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Moreover, we believe in the relevance of the trend to establish a link between peace and disarmament. However, we regret that this trend fails to establish a link between peace and progress, despite the closeness of this link."

Careful scrutiny of the main provisions of the draft convention and its annexes highlights imperfections and gaps despite the care taken to fill the gaps and meet the expectations of all sides. However, an overall assessment of the draft shows that it constitutes a compromise among the concerns which had been expressed. My delegation repeats its hope that the improvements introduced will make it possible to convince those who still doubt, so as to grant the convention the universal support that will guarantee the security of all States acceding to it, safeguard their legitimate interests, create the best conditions possible for implementation in a context of transparency and ensure unhindered cooperation for the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Given the importance of the chemical industry in its economy, because of the volume of production and exports, Morocco will ensure that it contributes to the executive council in the application of the provisions relating to trade in non-prohibited chemicals, and the relevant production technologies.

The success of the Conference in the field of chemical weapons deserves to be consolidated. To do this, we must, without delay, add tangible progress in the other areas within the mandate of the Conference, in particular in the nuclear field. This is a requirement that we have to meet all the more speedily as the international community keeps calling on us to do so. In this context, Morocco welcomes the recent decisions adopted by France, China and South Africa, announcing their accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. These initiatives, as well as the move by the United States to cut back on its nuclear tests, are along the right lines and will henceforth allow the Conference to view optimistically the prospect of a total ban on nuclear testing as a decisive step towards nuclear disarmament. We have always welcomed with relief the agreements reached by the two main nuclear Powers and their initiatives to bring about a substantial reduction in their arsenals. However, we continue to believe that only nuclear disarmament will put an end to the threats cast over the whole of mankind by this type of weapon. In this regard, the cessation of nuclear tests constitutes a high-priority objective. We express the hope that at its very next session, the Conference on Disarmament will give the Ad Hoc Committee a precise mandate to achieve this aim. The same can be said for the subject of negative security assurances, which remain fundamental for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, who continually call for legally binding rules to be drawn up in this area. We hope that all the nuclear Powers that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty will contribute to the development of a process leading towards this objective. The recent declarations made by France on this subject give us grounds for satisfaction.

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

Finally, it seems essential for the Conference to get down to taking the appropriate steps to safeguard outer space from any form of militarization. The Conference must identify appropriate means to remedy the legal vacuum affecting the use of space. The Ad Hoc Committee should be provided with a clear mandate to negotiate a new instrument to make it possible to define conditions for the use of outer space for purely peaceful purposes.

We welcome the fact that an innovative debate has now begun within our Conference on such important issues as the revision of the agenda or the establishment of new machinery which would strengthen the effectiveness of the Conference and its organs. In the view of my delegation, the Conference should, first and foremost, establish priorities on matters where progress is essential in order to allay the concerns of the international community. It would be tragic if the Conference were to fall back into lethargy after having achieved breakthroughs because we have no right to dash the renewed hopes in the ability of the sole multilateral negotiating body to translate the security needs of the international community into reality.

Today we are approaching the closure of an exceptional session of the Conference of Disarmament. It might be described as the session of renewal and hope. Morocco, which paid a heavy tribute to peace during the two world wars which caused so much bloodshed in Europe, attaches a high price to its preservation. Comprehensive and general disarmament is the price to be paid.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Ambassador Benhima, for your statement and for the kind words you addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Skogmo.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): First of all, let me congratulate Ambassador Servais on his appointment to the important function of President of the Conference on Disarmament. This is a most important period for the Conference. We feel certain that Ambassador Servais will conduct the Conference safely through the concluding days of the present session and in the inter-sessional period, when he has been tasked with the conduct of consultations on important issues.

Permit me briefly to introduce a new Norwegian contribution on chemical weapons, document CD/1169, distributed today, entitled "Transport of samples containing chemical warfare agents by air". This working paper is part of a series of research reports related to the verification of a CW convention submitted by Norway since 1982. This may be the last contribution we are making on the CW issue to the Conference on Disarmament here in Geneva, but I would like to assure members of the Conference of our continued intention to work on issues that would strengthen the CW when the focus of this work is shifted to the new headquarters of the new organization in The Hague.

The report we are introducing here today deals with the practical problems faced by those who, as a consequence of the CW convention, soon may have to transport scheduled CW compounds by air freight. Norwegian experts

(Mr. Skogmo, Norway)

have conducted trial shipments which are further described in the report. We hope that the experience we have gained in our trials may prove useful to other parties to the convention.

I could not miss this opportunity to say a few words on the convention that is about to be launched as the first international legal instrument negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament. Its importance for the international standing of this body cannot be exaggerated. The CW convention offers a universal instrument for removing vast quantities of a particularly abhorrent category of weapons. It provides a new basis for building confidence between nations. The untiring efforts of Ambassador von Wagner and his team command our respect and admiration. His efforts and the hard work of the Ad Hoc Committee were crowned with success last night. We all rejoice in this outcome.

A compromise text is seldom perfect, and the text before us is certainly no exception. The verification requirements could in our view, have been stronger. In spite of its shortcomings, my Government firmly believes that the treaty should go forward from the Conference on Disarmament for signature and that it deserves global adherence. The international community cannot wait another decade for the Conference on Disarmament to sort out residual national differences. The result after new rounds of negotiations would probably not be better than the product before us now.

After concluding the CW negotiations, the time is now ripe for the Conference on Disarmament to embark on a substantial discussion of the future of the Conference, including both its agenda and its structure. Norway sees a continued need for a multilateral negotiating body for global arms control agreements, building on regional achievements, but with the overriding aim of creating increased global security. You have all received an experts' study on a nuclear test ban, CD/1167, produced on the initiative of the Norwegian Foreign Minister. We hope that this study will provide food for thought, and that it demonstrates both the urgency and the practicability of addressing the issue of a nuclear test ban in the Conference on Disarmament. The experts' study calls for a nuclear-test-ban treaty by 1995. The CD has also important tasks ahead of it concerning non-proliferation issues, transparency in armaments, as well as other relevant confidence-building measures of a global nature.

The Conference on Disarmament is now also considering its working methods and composition. We are glad to note the report which is on our tables today from the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD, which observes that there is now general agreement that attention should be focused both on the agenda and membership of the Conference. Norway has actively participated in an observer capacity in the work of the CD. Since 1986 we have been the endorsed Western Group candidate for membership, and we hope that the decision to expand the Conference on Disarmament can now finally be implemented without further delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Norway for his words of encouragement and the statement he has just made. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

Mr. PEREZ NOVOA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your appointment to the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. You are occupying the Chair at a difficult time in our work, but I am sure that with your skill and experience you will see the work you have been assigned to a successful conclusion. Once again, on behalf of my delegation, I should like to express appreciation for the excellent work performed by your predecessor in the Chair.

The Cuban delegation listened carefully to the statement made by the Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Miguel Marín Bosch, in which he informed the Conference on Disarmament of the conclusion of the negotiations that had been under way for a number of months with a view to amending the present text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. As you know, at the beginning of this year, the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile presented a set of amendments to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of the Treaty, in order to adapt the text to the new situation to be found in our region as a result of developments in the nuclear field in Brazil and in Argentina. Our Government, which has been following the course of the negotiations since their commencement, had already informed the secretariat of OPANAL and the Governments of the aforementioned countries that the amendments they had tabled were acceptable to Cuba, although this did not denote any change in Cuba's position with respect to the Treaty in question, as set forth by our Government in the person of President Fidel Castro during the Ibero-American summit of heads of State and government held in the city of Guadalajara in July 1991, and recently reiterated by the Cuban Foreign Ministry. On all those occasions it was stressed that, although the reasons which had so far prevented Cuba from acceding to the Treaty of Tlatelolco still applied, out of concern for Latin American unity Cuba would sign the Treaty once all States in the region had assumed their obligations thereunder. At this meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to re-emphasize that the position of my Government, as expressed by President Fidel Castro in Guadalajara, remains unalterable.

My delegation takes note of the statement made by the distinguished representative of France, announcing to this Conference his Government's ratification of Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 24 August of this year. These steps eliminate existing obstacles to the entry into force of this international instrument for the entire region within the shortest possible time.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for the words of encouragement and the statement you have just made. I now see that the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Mashhadi, has asked for the floor.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, my delegation is happy to see you chairing our work in the Conference on Disarmament. We indeed need a President of your calibre to help us arrive at a successful conclusion of our work for the year 1992.

The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons practically came to an end yesterday, 26 August. My delegation acknowledges with great thanks and appreciation the relentless and meticulous work done by Ambassador von Wagner, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as well as his delegation. My delegation will seize another opportunity in the future to express its views on the text of the draft convention. The reason I have asked for the floor today is that pursuant to the statement made by my Ambassador on 21 August 1992 in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and also in the light of the discussions which have been made on article VIII, I have been instructed by my Government to make the following statement.

The Islamic Republic of Iran will agree to the transmission of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its appendix to the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly for its consideration. It, however, rejects totally the inclusion and transmission of provisions dealing with the composition of the executive council in its present form in article VIII to the United Nations General Assembly. This objection is to the content of the text which grants privileged seats to more than a third of the members of the executive council. States parties must have an equal chance to serve on the executive council and no country should have special privileges. Iran also opposes the procedure which led to the appearance of the text as it is. The negotiations on the composition of the executive council were held in a non-transparent manner by a few countries to get privileges at the cost of others. We have never received an explanation or justification for example why four countries should receive special treatment and be courted with special privileges in the Asian region. The Islamic Republic of Iran cannot agree to such discrimination.

The PRESIDENT: (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Mashhadi. We have taken note of your statement and I thank you personally for your words of encouragement. Now I have as the last speaker on my list Dr. Gaspar, who will speak on behalf of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

Mr. GASPAR (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work at the Conference in its final phase of the 1992 session. Upon instructions from my capital, I would like to make the following brief statement.

The delegation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic associates itself with the intervention made by Ambassador Errera of France at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons yesterday, 26 August 1992.

(Mr. Gaspar, Czechoslovakia)

I would request you, Mr. President, to reflect this position of my delegation in the official records of the Conference. Finally, I also wish to join those speakers who expressed appreciation and gratitude for the work of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador von Wagner, and his team, which led us to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the text of the chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Dr. Gaspar, for your words addressed to me and to Ambassador von Wagner. I wish to take this opportunity to thank all the delegations that have taken the floor to say how much they admired the activities and the way Ambassador von Wagner guided the work of the chemical weapons Committee. I do not think this is the last time we will have occasion to speak of the matter.

We have now reached the end of the list of speakers. First of all, is there any delegation that wishes to speak? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Spain.

Mr. PEREZ-VILLANUEVA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): Since I am taking the floor for the first time in this room under your Presidency, Sir, allow me to express my pleasure, my satisfaction, at being able to work under your presidency, under your stimulus, knowing your virtues and your effectiveness, from which your natural modesty, which only does you credit, in no way detracts.

Today I wish to address a few words to this meeting and those present here, members of the Conference or participating non-members, as we have decided to call this new category, simply to refer to something which my country and my Government regard as important in connection with the historic step we took yesterday in concluding, in the Conference on Disarmament and in the Committee on Chemical Weapons, the negotiations on that very category of weapons, after, if my count is not incorrect, 16 years of negotiations. I should like, before delving more into this subject, and with the few words I will venture to address to them, to express my thanks and the thanks of my Government to Ambassador Adolf von Wagner and equally so to his delegation, whose personal sacrifices I have observed over recent months, whose commitment, perseverance and brilliant professional skills have helped to secure the splendid result which we achieved yesterday.

Upon instructions from my Government I should like to state formally before this plenary that Spain supports, without any restrictions, the outcome of the negotiations on the treaty prohibiting chemical weapons, as embodied in the latest version of document WP/400/Rev.2. Consequently Spain will actively cooperate in the successive steps involving this instrument, in order to secure, within the speediest possible time, if not universal accession, then truly broad and representative accession by all the countries of the world, the civilized world, which hope to rid themselves of a particularly repellent category of weapons. Spain, I repeat, will actively cooperate in the practical matter of the start-up of the permanent organization established under the treaty, and will cooperate in terms of the human resources required, as well as any financial resources stemming from its participation.

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

I would also like to express a feeling of concern experienced by my Government at the results obtained and reflected in the text of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the Conference on Disarmament. I am of course referring to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, whose proceedings were concluded yesterday. This is a concern which I venture to express in this body in view of the fact that in the Ad Hoc Committee a non-member country, an observer country, does not as far as I know, have an opportunity to place on record its support for the positions of others. Therefore I venture to express before you Spain's concern at a new development - the reflection in a final report of the work of an ad hoc committee, and furthermore an ad hoc committee with a result of this nature, of an enormous, I would say disproportionate, number of country statements. Our concern refers, is founded, on the fact that we are not too clear about the significance that may derive from such a number of country statements in a report of this kind.

Our concern is based on legal considerations. We consider that these country statements are not reservations; if they are country reservations we have a serious problem on our hands, since they would be directly in conflict with the text of the treaty on chemical weapons, and if, as I hope, they are not country reservations, in any event they can be regarded as a body of legal doctrine which tomorrow, if necessary, would have to be employed to interpret unclear provisions in a text of this kind, and it is a particularly complex text. But there are political reasons for which my country and my Government consider that the report of the Committee on Chemical Weapons gives grounds for some concern. There are political reasons because on reading all of the document, and given the presence and the content of this large number of country statements, the resulting impression is a disheartening one, if you will allow me the word. We have arrived at what is truly a text of historic significance, with an extraordinarily complex verification system that many of us hope will prove effective, we have taken a truly significant step forward, which will probably come to be a milestone in the long history of disarmament and arms control negotiations, and the final result when you read the report is that there is an excessive reluctance on the part of those very countries which have taken part in the negotiations and have participated actively in the negotiations over a particularly lengthy period of time.

Bearing in mind this concern, my country would like to emphasize that it fully subscribes to the clarfication formulated by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom within the Committee on Chemical Weapons itself to the effect that none of the country statements to be found in the final document constitutes an alternative version or a binding element for the interpretation of the document. Consequently, these country statements have no more standing than that conferred on them by the fact that they convey the national position of a country. My Government also wishes to express, and does so through me, our support for the interpretation that the French delegation formulated yesterday, concerning its understanding of the results and the consequences of the text arrived at after such lengthy negotiations, which reflects the

(Mr. Pérez-Villanueva, Spain)

agreement on chemical weapons as set forth in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee. That is what I wished to say before this plenary today, Sir. I thank you for your patience and interest and reiterate that at all events, from now onwards, until the moment when the opening of the conference for the signature and ratification of this treaty occurs, in Paris it would seem, my country will devote all its resources, or at least those at its disposal, to encourage the fullest possible adherence to this instrument.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your words of encouragement and the statement you have just made, which will be duly taken into account in accordance with the rules and procedures of our Conference. I now have on my list the representative of Turkey, who had asked for the floor. I would like at this stage, not in order to urge him to be very brief, but given the late hour and the business remaining on the agenda, I would like succeeding speakers to display as much restraint as possible so that we can finish in due time.

Mr. ARAR (Turkey) (translated from French): Yesterday, in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the French delegation made a statement on the text of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Several delegations associated themselves with that statement. Furthermore, during the most recent meetings of the Committee, certain delegations expressed their feelings on the draft and requested that their statements be published in the report which the Conference is going to endorse. As far as Turkey is concerned I wish to state that, very naturally, my country continues to feel firmly attached to the final communiqué of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at ministerial level in Turnberry in the United Kingdom on 7 and 8 June 1990. This communiqué was in fact published as a CD document with the number CD/1006. With your permission I would like to quote paragraph 6 of that communiqué, which relates specifically to chemical weapons:

> "We believe the United States-Soviet agreement on reducing chemical weapons stockpiles will provide great impetus towards the earliest possible conclusion of the convention for an effectively verifiable, global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons now being negotiated, which remains our goal. All allies hereby state their intention to be among the original signatories to the convention and to promote its early entry into force. We call on all other States to undertake a similar commitment. We reaffirm our determination to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and of missiles capable of carrying such weapons."

Since work on the draft convention has just been completed, we believe that the second part of the paragraph relating to the intention of the allies to be among the original signatories and the call to all other States to undertake a similar commitment remains valid. This explains my delegation's position.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you. I am all the more alive to what you have said as I myself helped in the drafting of the Turnberry declaration, and I take a certain pleasure in hearing it repeated here. I would now like to give the floor to the last speaker I have on my list, the distinguished representative of Austria.

Mr. GEHR (Austria) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to associate myself personally with the congratulations which the Ambassador of Austria, Professor Winfried Lang, extended to you in his last statement in the plenary. Having taken part in the consultations conducted by Ambassador Kamal on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, and having read the report on the subject distributed as document CD/WP.435, I would like to express my delegation's satisfaction that in future you will be in charge of the consultations on the future of both the agenda and the membership of the Conference, a future which has been opened up, inter alia, by the eclipse of the rigid East-West dialectic. In this context the Austrian delegation would like to state expressly here its great interest in this work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank you for your words of encouragement and your support for the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. I think that I can close the list of speakers by giving the floor to the representative of Chile.

Mr. ROMERO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): My delegation has already had occasion to congratulate you, Sir, on taking up the post of President of this Conference. Today I would just like to put on record the effective way you have been guiding the debate in it.

I asked for the floor to refer to the report presented today by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan on the consultations carried out to improve the effective functioning of this Conference. In this regard, I wish to associate myself with what has been said today by other observer delegations to the effect that they have noted with satisfaction the fact that you, Sir, assisted by the next President and the Secretary-General, will be holding consultations during the inter-sessional period on questions relating to the restructuring of the agenda and the expansion of the membership of this Conference and that in this process you are also going to involve the observer delegations. We think that this will be a step of great importance since in this very plenary my delegation has expressed its views on the agenda and membership on several occasions. It is for that reason that I can inform you that the Chilean delegation is prepared to discuss these important issues with you, Sir, whenever you feel it appropriate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Chile for his kind words of encouragement. If there are no other speakers wishing to take the floor, I would like to move on to other matters and to try to deal with them before the 1 p.m. deadline.

(The President)

Further to the suggestion made by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events in paragraph 14 of the Group's progress report, under the symbol CD/1163, that a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be invited to participate in the Group's next session next February, the draft of a letter from the President to the Director General of the Agency was distributed on Tuesday at the meeting of coordinators and China. It was agreed that if no objections were raised before this plenary meeting, the letter would be sent as drafted. This is indeed the case and I shall therefore proceed as planned.

I would now like to invite the Conference to take note, with appreciation of course, of the report which was introduced to us by Ambassador Kamal in his capacity as Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, the text of which has been issued as CD/WP.435. If there are no objections, I will consider the report adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Regarding this document CD/WP.435, I announced during the consultations on the drafting of substantive paragraphs last Tuesday that the recommendations contained in this report had been faithfully reflected in the substantive paragraphs on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which have been distributed under the symbol CD/WP.436. I had proposed that if the secretariat had received no objections or comments from delegations before 10 a.m. on Wednesday, the text would be included in the draft annual report. Since it had received no comments from delegations by then, the secretariat will proceed as indicated above.

I would now like to take stock of the worrying situation with regard to the drafting of our annual report to the General Assembly (CD/WP.428). The secretariat is now actively engaged in preparing revision 1 of this document, which will contain the following items. First, the technical parts of the report, originally distributed as document CD/WP.428. Second, all the paragraphs on the items on the agenda on which the Conference did not set up subsidiary bodies, namely items 1, 2 and 3, part of item 7 and items 8 and 9. Third, consideration of the question relating to the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 44/116 O, concerning the seabed Treaty. Fourth, paragraphs on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, distributed by the secretariat last Tuesday. We will therefore be using document CD/WP.428/Rev.1 for the second reading of the draft report at an informal meeting, for which unfortunately I cannot set a date for you now, but about which I will keep all delegations informed. The difficulty has arisen from the fact that, contrary to what Ambassador Berasategui promised the technical services and the secretariat at the beginning of the third part of the session, that is on 20 July, that progress would be made on the non-chemical items so that the end of this last part of the session could be given over entirely to problems related to the chemical weapons convention,

(The President)

unfortunately that has not been the case because it was only on the morning of the day before yesterday that we were able to resolve the delicate pending issues on several items on the agenda. Having said that, there was therefore an overload for the technical services, both in editing and in translation, with the result that these services are absolutely unable to give me a precise date for the completion of their work. But naturally they are going to do their utmost to ensure that this happens as soon as possible.

That explanation was perhaps a little long, but was necessary in order to explain the uncertain situation I am in concerning the date for the convening of this second reading, which will take place as soon as possible and in any case, of course, before the last plenary meeting, when we will adopt the report. The reports of the subsidiary bodies, which will be an integral part of the Conference's report to the General Assembly, will be added by the secretariat as usual immediately after the draft report has been adopted, during the finalization of the official text which will be circulated as an official Conference document and sent to the United Nations General Assembly.

Before I adjourn this meeting I would like to inform you that we have not distributed a timetable for next week because we are planning only one plenary meeting on Thursday, 3 September, and I would remind you that there will also be an informal meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on Wednesday, 2 September at 3 p.m., a quite informal meeting - have no fears that we will be reopening the debate on the content of the report. I think there will be an exchange of views on the preparatory committee. I would also remind you that there will be an informal meeting devoted, as I informed you, to the second reading of the draft annual report at the earliest date that can physically be arranged.

As we have come to the end of the agenda, I will adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 3 September at 10 a.m. Since it is probably going to be a long one, I invite you all to be here at 10 o'clock sharp.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.